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Chapter 1
From Temür to Selim: Trajectories of Turko-Mongol 
State Formation in Islamic West-Asia’s Long 
Fifteenth Century
Jo Van Steenbergen
This chapter presents both a general overview and trans-dynastic interpreta-
tion of the power elites of fifteenth century Islamic West-Asia, their institutions 
and practices, and the many transformations that marked their trajectories 
across the rough political landscape of the time.1 As far as that overview is con-
cerned, the chapter retraces the general contours of these many crisscrossing 
trajectories of trans-regional, regional and local empowerment that distin-
guished the landscape from Nile to Oxus and from Bosporus to Indus between 
the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries ce 
(or  the end of the eighth and the beginning of the tenth centuries ah). In a 
rather traditional fashion, the chapter focuses in particular on describing spe-
cific trajectories of trans-regional empowerment. These appeared in the for-
mat of dynastic and non-dynastic hegemonic constellations of power elites 
that engaged in competing politics of conquest, integration, reproduction and 
exploitation, or of war-making and state-making, on a trans-regional or even 
West-Asian scale. The chapter will of course also have to consider other trajec-
tories of empowerment as equally meaningful components of fifteenth- century 
Islamic West-Asia’s political history, even when they did not necessarily  involve 
or relate to any identifiable processes of state-making. The latter trajectories 
range from those on the more local level of non-complex social groups related 
to a town, village, urban neighborhood, tribal pasture or small-scale communi-
ty to regional ones, operating within more complex composites of social groups, 
1 This chapter has been finalized within the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate ii: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth- 
Century Egypt and Syria’ (UGent, 2017–21); this project has received funding from the Euro-
pean Research Council (erc) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and in-
novation program (Consolidator Grant agreement No 681510). My sincere thanks go to Evrim 
Binbaş, Frederik Buylaert, Kenneth Goudie, Zacharie Mochtari de Pierrepont and Patrick 
Wing for reading and commenting upon earlier versions of this chapter. Needless to say, 
I take sole responsibility for the interpretations presented here as well as for any remaining 
inaccuracies.
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especially in particular geographic and ecological units of West-Asia’s diverse 
landscape. For mostly practical reasons, the consideration of these local and 
regional trajectories will mainly be organized around their multivalent inter-
sections with those dominant trans-regional trajectories of the Ottomans in 
and beyond Islamic West-Asia’s Northwest, of various Timurid and Turkmen 
dynasts in its North and East, and of the sultans of Cairo in the Southwest. In 
these ways this chapter aims both to make fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s 
political history in general more accessible and intelligible to wider audiences 
and to contextualize this volume’s specific case studies, all of which relate to 
the remarkable processes of expansion and centralization that marked those 
trans-regional trajectories.
This chapter also invites specialists of the histories of these different trajecto-
ries to rethink their understanding within the wider frameworks of West-Asian 
connectivity and state formation. To this end, it adopts an entangled and the-
matic approach to these histories. This means that this chapter crosses the 
boundaries that tend to continue to divide West-Asia’s history into separate, 
dynastically-organized research traditions in particular amongst Ottomanists, 
Mamlukologists and Timurid-Turkmen specialists. The chapter aims to inte-
grate those dynastic boundaries more explicitly into its explanations and inter-
pretations, seeing these as markings of variations on deeply interconnected 
trans-dynastic phenomena and as common sources of meaningful distinction 
in particular historical and historiographical contexts. In order to do so, this 
chapter reconstructs those phenomena and contexts into meaningful descrip-
tive and interpretive units. The choice of units is informed by current (especially 
minimalist and practice-oriented) theoretical understandings of premodern 
states, of how they become, and what they do (and not do), as detailed in the 
following chapter.2 The first part of the current chapter consists of introductory 
2 For the sake of clarity, it is already relevant to refer here to Charles Tilly’s historicizing defini-
tions of what states are and what they do. These will be explained (and problematized) in 
more detail in the next chapter. However, it is a deliberate choice to allow these definitions to 
substantially inspire the focus and organization of this chapter. Tilly sees states as “coercion-
wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” 
(Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 1). Elsewhere he outlines what he thinks these 
organizations did in the following minimalist terms: “Under the general heading of organized 
violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War mak-
ing: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have 
clear and continuous priority as wielders of force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutraliz-
ing their rivals inside those territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies 
of their clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities—
war making, state making, and protection”. (Tilly, “War Making and State Making”, p. 181). See 
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explanations that describe the main political players and playgrounds in Is-
lamic West-Asia, while the second part takes an interpretive approach to dis-
cuss the rules and stakes of these games of power. This approach builds upon a 
general scholarly consensus concerning basic facts and figures, and as the next 
chapter engages in much detail with the current state of relevant Ottoman, 
Timurid-Turkmen and Syro-Egyptian political history research, literature ref-
erences here are kept to a minimum, used only to support, illustrate or explain 
certain interpretations. This approach continues in the third part of the chap-
ter, moving towards a more critical consideration of the historical dynamics 
that help to better understand the remarkable interplay of socio-political con-
tinuities and changes in Islamic West-Asia’s political history. These continu-
ities and changes appear as specific fifteenth-century convergences of phe-
nomena that are all similarly related to processes of state formation and 
therefore invite to be considered from trans-regional and trans-dynastic per-
spectives. They include the contingency of centralizing longevity, the integra-
tion of distant power elites through multivalent processes of bureaucratic 
growth, the particularity of outsiders’ coercive integration as a strategy of elite 
renewal, and simultaneously the reproduction of central elites in highly com-
petitive ways. In the discussion of these different phenomena, occasional ref-
erence is also made to the different chapters in Parts 2 and 3, and to how their 
case studies make for highly illustrative examples. An epilogue finally consid-
ers the nature and formation of fifteenth-century socio-political boundaries 
and how these relate to specific formulations of an ideal, discursive framework 
of social order and political sovereignty.
1 Situating Agents and Agencies of State Formation in Fifteenth-
Century West-Asia
The late fourteenth century reign of the Central-Asian ruler Temür (r.  1370–1405) 
was a kind of matrix moment for the histories of Islamic West-Asia’s main 
 fifteenth-century polities and political elites. Temür, also known as Tīmūr in 
 Arabic and Persian, or as Tamerlane in European languages, certainly had a 
 remarkable career. Remembered especially for his feats of conquest, plunder 
and fearsome havoc on a Eurasian scale, Temür also stands out for the unique 
level of personal empowerment, cultural efflorescence and successful state 
formation that he achieved in the Mongol, Turkish and Muslim contexts of 
also Chapter Two in this volume, especially “Introduction: Defining the ‘state’ between Max 
Weber, ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun and Charles Tilly”.
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both the Chagatai nomadic polity of Central-Asia and the ancient urban cen-
ters and cultures of Transoxiana, Khurasan and Iran. Across Islamic West-Asia, 
Temür’s successes stimulated the consolidation of hybrid leaderships, political 
identities and charismatic hegemonies that often combined Turkmen, Turk-
ish, Kurdish, Arabo-Persian and Mongol facets. In fact, his personal politics of 
conquest enabled not just the rise to power of his family and entourage as a 
new trans-regional elite in Islamic West-Asia, but also led to the new or re-
newed empowerment of various local and regional elites, particularly those of 
a Turkmen nomadic background. In this way Temür’s political action con-
firmed and boosted the so-called “eastward reflux” of Turko-Mongol leader-
ships, following the thirteenth-century wave of westward expansion from 
Mongol Inner Asia.3
This important moment in West-Asia’s history indeed brought to power an 
entirely new, mostly peripatetic trans-regional power elite in Transoxiana, 
Khurasan and Iran (see map 2). This new elite was composed of two different 
groups. On the one hand there were Temür’s many descendants who grew into 
a new dynasty of Turko-Mongol royal status known as the Timurids. On the 
other hand, there were the military leaders of Temür’s armies, who stemmed 
from various Turko-Mongol Chagatai origins. Tried, tested and bred in the per-
sonal entourage of Temür, these princes and commanders continued to domi-
nate these eastern regions’ politics for many decades after Temür’s death, and 
in varying constellations and associations that included also their own descen-
dants. In Transoxiana and Khurasan this highly dynamic Timurid domination 
even lasted up to the turn of the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries (see map 4).
Beyond these core areas of Timurid leadership, Temür’s conquest politics 
of undermining or annihilating the authorities of regional and trans-regional 
rivals created political opportunities for various local power elites, including 
tribal leaderships and messianic movements, especially in the regions stretch-
ing from Iraq and Azerbaijan to Anatolia (see map 1). Throughout most of 
the century, these regions, with their ideal winter and summer pastures, their 
3 See Loiseau, “Le siècle turc”, p. 36, who takes this notion of a reflux from Woods, The Aqquyun-
lu, p. 3, who, in turn, explains that he took it from the pioneering studies of Minorsky and 
Sümer: “Amplifying the earlier view of Minorsky, Sümer notes the eastward reflux from Ana-
tolia of the Mongol Oirot, Jalayir, and Süldüz after 1335/736 in addition to the three Turkmen 
‘waves’ composed of the Qaraquyunlu, the Aqquyunlu, and the Safavid Qizilbash that swept 
out of Anatolia over Iran in the fifteenth/ninth and sixteenth/tenth centuries”. (see Anony-
mous. Tadhkirat al-mulūk: a manual of Ṣafavid administration (ca. 1137/1725), V.F. Minorsky, 
ed. and trans. (e.j.w. Gibb memorial series vol. 16) [London: Luzac, 1943], appendices, p. 188; 
Faruk Sümer, Oguzlar (Türkmenler), tarihleri, boy teşkilâtı, destanları (Ankara: Üniversitesi 
Basımevi, 1967), pp. 143–153).
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fertile river basins, and their multiple commercial networks of towns and 
routes, remained a politically unstable and poly-centric area, characterized 
not only by intense mobility but also high fluidity. They may therefore be con-
sidered one of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s main frontier zones; an 
area where “one could move from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and 
identity to identity with an ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in 
more settled societies”.4 In fact, connecting West-Asia’s centers of somewhat 
more stable political, commercial and cultural activities (especially—but not 
exclusively—the urban centers of Bursa, Edirne and Constantinople in the 
Northwest; Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo in the Southwest; Tabriz in the North; 
and Herat and Samarkand in the East) those towns and routes of Iraq, Diyar 
Bakr, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Anatolia, and the diverse local elites that con-
trolled them, remained a trans-regional bone of contention, and thus were a 
genuine frontier zone, marking the borderlands between remote but ambi-
tious  trans-regional leaderships, such as that of the Timurid Shah Rukh 
(r.  1409–47) in the East, of the Ottoman sultans Murad (r. 1421–51), Mehmed 
(r. 1451–81) and Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) in the Northwest, and of the Sultanate of 
Cairo and its many mamlūk rulers, including the sultans Barsbay (r. 1422–38), 
Jaqmaq (r.  1438–53), Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and Qansawh (r. 1501–16), in the 
Southwest.
First subdued by Temür’s passage through Anatolia and Syria in the opening 
years of the fifteenth century and then all but annihilated by subsequent years 
of territorial fragmentation and internecine warfare, the Ottoman and Syro-
Egyptian polities only re-emerged as strong trans-regional power centers from 
about the mid-1410s onwards (see map 2). In the process, as will be detailed 
below, newly composed politico-military elites rose to power in both Sultan-
ates, and both had in common their origins of enslavement (mostly in the Bal-
kans and in the Caucasus respectively), socialization in royal military and 
court service, and acculturation to particular Turkic-Muslim political identi-
ties. In many ways, these power elites thus became more alike than would be 
suggested by their organization around the century-old Ottoman dynasty in 
the Northwest and the even older Sultanate of Cairo in the Southwest. In the 
course of the fifteenth century a scramble for West-Asian control and influ-
ence regularly pitted these elites and their sultanic rulers against each other. 
Initially this conflict mostly happened indirectly, through local and regional 
4 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 140–141; here he is speaking of Western Anatolia, but the 
definition works equally well for this frontier zone in the fifteenth century. For an illustration 
of frontier conditions in this zone in the 1420s and 1430s, see Adriaenssen and Van Steenber-
gen, “Mamluk Authorities and Anatolian Realities”.
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intermediaries, but increasingly it was also direct, through diplomatic ex-
change and military confrontation. To some extent, the campaigns of the Otto-
man sultan Selim (r. 1512–20) in Azerbaijan in 1514 and his conquests of Syria in 
1516, and then of Egypt in 1517, also fit into this complex pattern of ongoing re-
gional competition for sovereignty, influence and control in that enormous 
frontier zone of fifteenth-century trans-regional politics. At the very least, 
these campaigns and conquests of the early sixteenth century radically 
changed the stakes that had dominated the previous century, forcing many 
elites and activities in the frontier zone of Armenia, Diyar Bakr and eastern 
Anatolia to become more firmly integrated into an exclusively Ottoman frame-
work of sovereignty, endeavoring to push political boundaries out- and east-
wards, and allowing them to be reframed more simply along an ancient East-
West politico -military axis.
Before that re-orientation of the political landscape of West-Asia, however, 
this gigantic poly-centric zone—connecting in myriad ways Egypt, Northwest 
Anatolia, and Khurasan and Transoxiana—operated very much as a labora-
tory  of fifteenth-century political (and cultural) experimentation. This in-
volved  various local and regional elites and their shifting loyalties as much 
as the more remote and continuously contested trans-regional leaderships of 
Timurids, Ottomans, Turkmen and ‘Turks’ (as the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate’s 
politico-military elites were identified by their contemporaries).5 In the his-
torical regions of Southern and Eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Diyar 
Bakr and Iraq in particular, various old and new movements, networks, com-
munities and chieftainships benefitted, with varying degrees of success and 
sovereignty, from the renewed local political opportunities created by both 
5 In remarkable contrast European and modern historiography generally all refer to members 
of this Syro-Egyptian power elite as Mamluks (as a result of the mamlūk, or military slave 
status of the majority of them) rather than ‘Turks’. However, this is an external label that 
poses many interpretive challenges for significant but as yet largely unacknowledged reasons 
(see Ayalon, “Baḥrī Mamlūks, Burjī Mamlūks”; Yosef, “Dawlat al-Atrāk or Dawlat al-Mamālīk?”; 
Van Steenbergen, “Nomen est Omen”; Van Steenbergen, “Mamlukisation between social theo-
ry and social practice”). In the first part of this volume we will therefore use this traditional 
Mamluk label when referring to the field of ‘Mamluk’ studies only, and not when referring to 
this Sultanate and its elites. When referring to the latter we draw on an interesting analogy 
(and synchronism) with standard references to the North-Indian Delhi Sultanate or Sultan-
ate of Delhi (1206–1526) and its different ruling dynasties, including of mamlūk and Turkish 
origins. We will therefore mostly use the signifiers ‘Cairo Sultanate’ or ‘Sultanate of Cairo’ and 
‘Syro-Egyptian elite’ in this volume’s first two chapters (see e.g. Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sul-
tanate. A political and military history [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003]; Iqtidar 
Husain Siddiqi, Composite Culture under the Sultanate of Delhi. Revised and Enlarged Edition 
[Delhi: Primus Books, 2016]).
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Temür’s campaigns and subsequent contested trans-regional leaderships. 
Within this fluid, permeable and poly-centric zone many participated in the 
endless negotiations of local balances of socio-economic, political and cultur-
al interests with violence, charismatic leadership, millenarianist ideas and dip-
lomatic pragmatism.6 Throughout the century, however, some leaderships 
emerged as more successful, more powerful and more regionally reputed than 
others in a wide range of different local contexts.
In this way, the Karamanid dynasty was first subdued by the Ottomans but 
then restored to their fourteenth-century regional primacy by Temür, and 
eventually claimed priority from the ancient Anatolian capital of Konya 
throughout much of the South-central Anatolian mountain lands and plains. 
Especially during the long and expansionist rule of Ibrahim Beg Karamanoglu 
(r. ca. 1423–64), the Karamanid leadership vied variously and in alternating 
ways with other Anatolian chiefs as well as with the Ottoman and ‘Turkish’ 
sultans for local and regional sovereignty. The Karamanids had two main com-
petitors among these Anatolian leaderships: the Ramadanids who sought to 
impose some form of regional authority and control over the Cilician coastal 
plains from the towns of Tarsus and Adana, and the Dulkadirid lineage, simi-
larly claiming priority on the Anti-Taurus plateau from their seats of power in 
the towns of Elbistan and Maraş (Kahramanmaraş) (see maps 2 and 3). From 
the late 1460s onwards, external pressures on these so-called ‘Turkmen’ dynas-
ties in South-central Anatolia increased at a varying but unrelenting pace to 
the extent that they were all eventually subdued by, or fully integrated into the 
trans-regional claims to power and sovereignty that were emanating ever more 
intensely from Ottoman Constantinople in particular, as well as from Cairo 
(see map 4).
In the regions of Diyar Bakr, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iraq competition for 
local and regional priority and assets was dominated by two other Turkmen 
tribal groupings (see map 2). These groups seem to have maintained a higher 
level of transhumant activity than their Dulkadirid, Ramadanid and Karama-
nid peers. The chiefs of the Qara Qoyunlu (the Clan of the Black Sheep) were 
among the few fourteenth-century regional leaderships that managed to sur-
vive Temür’s onslaught and they eventually even regained priority status in 
and beyond their former east-Anatolian territories. This was above all thanks 
to their charismatic Qara Qoyunlu chief Qara Yusuf (d. 1420), whose military 
6 See e.g. Binbaş, “Did the Hurufis Mint Coins?”, p. 139, which refers briefly to various “intel-
lectual movements which acquired a political character and minted coins in the late medi-
eval period”, as well as to “other cases in which the boundaries between tribal-cum-local 
elites and religious-intellectual networks are blurred or cannot be drawn accurately”.
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successes from 1406 onwards established his sovereignty over all of these re-
gions, effectively forming a block within this enormous zone between the Cau-
casus and the Persian Gulf which hindered the territorial ambitions and inter-
ests of the Timurid Shah Rukh in Herat in particular. Qara Yusuf’s son and 
successor Iskandar (d. 1438) was confronted with the consequences of this 
growing tension, in the form of substantial pressures from Shah Rukh and his 
armies as well as from various local groups acting as allies to the Timurids or 
others. These pressures eventually all proved ineffective, and Iskandar’s son 
Jahan Shah (r. 1439–67) managed to consolidate his predecessors’ achieve-
ments, even stepping into the Timurid void after Shah Rukh’s death and estab-
lishing his own sovereignty over many formerly Timurid lands in Iran. Jahan 
Shah achieved this from the Qara Qoyunlu center in Tabriz, eventually evolv-
ing into an awe-inspiring trans-regional ruler in his own right over most of 
central West-Asia (see map 3).
In 1467, when Jahan Shah was captured in battle and executed, the story of 
Qara Qoyunlu trans-regional leadership in Eastern Anatolia, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Iraq and Iran proved to be short-lived. However, more consolidated 
Turkmen rule in these regions continued along very similar lines, when Uzun 
Hasan (r. 1457–78), leader of the Aq Qoyunlu (the Clan of the White Sheep), 
seized the opportunity to step into Jahan Shah’s footsteps. This led to the ac-
commodation, absorption or integration of Qara Qoyunlu (and formerly 
Timurid) relationships, balances, and achievements into an adapted trans- 
regional order, now dominated by the Qara Qoyunlu’s longstanding Anatolian 
rivals of the Aq Qoyunlu. It also meant that the Aq Qoyunlu tribal group and its 
leaders finally extended their influence beyond the mere control of the trade 
routes and the transhumant network of Diyar Bakr and Southern Armenia (see 
maps 2 and 3). This zone until then had defined their area of operation, com-
petition and relationships since the days of the alliance between Temür and 
one of the Aq Qoyunlu’s most charismatic early chiefs, Uzun Hasan’s grandfa-
ther ʿUthman Beg Qara Yuluk (d. 1435). Uzun Hasan and his immediate succes-
sors now took Tabriz in Azerbaijan as their seat of power and they maintained 
for more than three decades at least some level of sovereignty over the highly 
diverse chain of lands, people and resource flows that connected the Cauca-
sian mountain lands, the Iraqi lowlands and the Iranian plateau (see map 4). In 
that enormous frontier zone of fifteenth-century trans-regional politics these 
territories thus increasingly became a more or less coherent political space 
that was organized around Turkmen leadership in Tabriz. In the Southwest, 
the expansion of this new political coherence was curbed by Syria’s ancient 
dominance from Cairo. In the Northwest its reach was limited by an equally 
increasingly coherent Ottoman sovereignty and Anatolian dominance, sealed 
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by the Ottoman victory over Uzun Hasan at the Battle of Bashkent in eastern 
Anatolia in 1473. In the East, the reach of Turkmen transregional authority con-
tinued to be checked by Timurid princes claiming leadership from the main 
urban centers of Khurasan and Transoxiana.
2 Situating Practices and Institutions of State Formation in Fifteenth 
Century West-Asia
In some ways these competing leaderships of fifteenth-century Islamic West-
Asia, from Ottoman, Syro-Egyptian and Timurid sultans to various Turkmen 
leaders and rulers, all have similar profiles, marked by the marginality of 
their social origins, the martial nature of their socio-political identities and 
the ‘Turkishness’ of their linguistic and cultural idiom. Given the common 
setting of their political action amidst Islamic West-Asia’s settled Arabo-Per-
sian environments, the historical profiles of these sultans, leaders and rulers 
are all also marked by the same experimental creativity and hybrid mix of 
memories, practices and institutions that they and their entourages used to 
explain and reproduce the messy and often violent political realities that 
emerged from these marginal, martial and Turkish contexts. Across Islamic 
West-Asia, these diverse fifteenth-century realities of leadership and their ex-
planations all remained deeply rooted in longstanding interconnected imagi-
nations and traditions of trans-regional political action. This type of political 
connectivity is often labeled as the Turko-Mongol factor of fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia. This is a shorthand for capturing the combined features of 
nomadic (or semi-nomadic) roots and Perso-Islamic, Turko-Saljuq and Mon-
gol-Chinggisid precedent that determined in multivalent structuring ways 
these realities and explanations of political action across fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia.
The second part of this chapter will provide an overview of those Turko-
Mongol features that are central to understanding fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia’s history and the politics of its leaderships. These involve particular 
practices and institutions of socio-political reproduction and transformation, 
of socio-economic accumulation and redistribution, and of political organiza-
tion and state formation. These main practices and institutions of Turko- 
Mongol politics are discussed here only in a general way. As announced above, 
the purpose here is to frame these features from trans-dynastic perspectives 
and informed by state formation studies. As such an approach is not very com-
mon within the field of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian history, it has to 
be stressed that the occasionally more unorthodox interpretations that are 
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also presented here are above all intended to stimulate further discussion and 
exploration.
2.1 Turko-Mongol Socio-political Praxis
The presence and impact of the Turko-Mongol factor as outlined above have 
been generally regarded as being most visible through the widespread ancient 
appanage and tanistry practices that continued to regulate the distribution 
and reproduction of power, status and resources within elite lineages and po-
litical communities. These practices operated in diverse and multivalent ways 
between Cairo, Constantinople, Tabriz and Herat, and they continued to rein-
vigorate centrifugal tendencies and to obfuscate or even obstruct the pathways 
towards political stabilization and centralization, albeit with varying levels of 
success. Appanage and its cognate tanistry refer to the fact that the Turko-
Mongol mindset considered entitlement to privileges and social distinction, as 
well as succession to status, wealth, power and authority, as collective elitist 
arrangements. At the same time, these arrangements were nowhere organized 
in any straightforward hierarchies of individual rights, priorities and obliga-
tions. Rather, they always had to be acquired in highly competitive social cir-
cumstances, and agnatic kinship and seniority were only one asset among 
many here, alongside highly individualized qualities such as ambition, charis-
ma, political acumen, coercive prowess and even longevity. Political participa-
tion in this context of regular dynastic fragmentation and violent succession to 
leadership was not just a matter of birth or choice, but also of social survival 
and necessity, and power elites were left with no choice but to partake actively 
and continuously in political action. As a result, this politicization of all social 
relationships continued to favor the individual expertise and personal clout of 
successful military entrepreneurs among the members of those elites. “[Tanis-
try] politicized society, and it personalized monarchy”, as one of the pioneers 
of the study of Inner Asian and Turko-Mongol politics, Joseph Fletcher, put it.7
7 Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 240. See also 
Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 19–23 (following Dickson, “Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Six-
teenth Century”) for a more nuanced (if limiting) consideration of the tensions between so-
called corporatism and dynasticism that together constitute tanistry as it is conceptualized 
here. Whereas in the Ottoman context, as Fletcher argues, this practice gave rise to the well-
known (and eventually codified) royal succession tradition of fratricide, its dividing presence 
in and impact on Timurid and Turkmen dispensations is also well known. (See also Binbaş, 
“Condominial Sovereignty and Condominial Messianism” for an interesting corrective about 
shared notions of rule in certain Timurid contexts). This phenomenon is perhaps most tell-
ingly illustrated by the ways in which the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Jahan Shah stepped into the 
footsteps of the Timurid Shah Rukh or how the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan stepped into 
those of Jahan Shah. For examples and discussions from the Cairo Sultanate in the Southwest, 
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In this context of Turko-Mongol political praxis, success was highly person-
al, and leaders such as Temür, Murad, Jaqmaq, Uzun Hasan and their peers and 
descendants had to constantly fight for their survival. Political order and stabil-
ity were a widely shared responsibility as well as a highly volatile symbolic con-
struction, which faced continuous pressures, both from within and from with-
out. In fact, as will be detailed below, the Ottoman Sultanate in the Northwest, 
its ‘Turkish’ counterpart in the Syro-Egyptian Southwest, the Timurids in 
Khurasan and Transoxiana and somewhat belatedly also the Turkmen in Azer-
baijan and Iran managed to check the returning centrifugal consequences of 
these practices and pressures, even though in most cases only in contingent 
ways and to a certain extent. The process of state formation in these cases fea-
tured the gradual appearance of a coherent central political apparatus and of 
the concomitant idea that there was one autonomous ‘Turkish’, Ottoman, 
Timurid or eventually even Turkmen hegemonic political order. This process 
favored, in diverse ways, centripetal strategies that limited any effects of the 
elite fragmentations that were plaguing tanistric moments of succession in 
Cairo, in Edirne and Constantinople, in Tabriz, and in Herat and Samarkand. 
This never happened in any similarly stabilizing ways for other leaderships 
with trans-regional ambitions in fifteenth-century West-Asia, and the evapora-
tion of Timurid authorities in Anatolia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and West-
Iran and the successive territorial expansions of the Qara and Aq Qoyunlu be-
tween the 1450s and 1470s had as much to do with these internal reproductive 
weaknesses as with the military successes of charismatic leaders like Jahan 
Shah and Uzun Hasan.
Most important for a proper understanding of the impact of Turko-Mongol 
socio-political praxis, perhaps, is the fact that, even under the latter Timurid 
and Turkmen umbrellas of unstable trans-regional leaderships, rapid political 
transformation had no more effect on the political practices and identities of 
most local and regional power elites in Eastern Anatolia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Iraq and most of Iran than it did on their counterparts in the more stable po-
litical contexts of Ottoman Anatolia, ‘Turkish’ Syro-Egypt, or Timurid Khurasan 
and Transoxiana. Loyalties and allegiances shifted and sovereignties and re-
gional priorities were constantly renegotiated, while political spaces and fields 
of power were incessantly redefined as a consequence of tanistric competi-
tion. In all of these regions, however, local and regional groups of political ac-
tors and their stakes and assets were far more enduring, changing primarily as 
a consequence of the many realities of social, cultural and physical mobility. 
see Adriaenssen and Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Authorities and Anatolian Realities”; Van 
Steenbergen, “Caught between Heredity and Merit”.
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This relative social stability moreover not only concerned those who propa-
gated rural or urban violence in ever changing political constellations, but it 
also characterized many other elite groups and individuals who wielded some 
form of leverage and political clout. All of this meant that across Islamic West-
Asia, Turko-Mongol leaderships never fully achieved any monopoly of power 
as their political relationships tended to be crisscrossed, checked or even un-
dermined not just by appanage and tanistry practices, but also by the assets, 
strategies, and tools of those who had other skills to tap into local and regional 
flows of cultural, political and economic resources. Beatrice Manz, in her study 
of the reign of the Timurid ruler Shah Rukh, described as follows the effect of 
this atomistic and highly volatile situation on the political landscape within 
which the Timurids operated:
The towns from which the Timurids ruled their dominions were like an 
archipelago within a sea of semi-independent regions, over which con-
trol was a matter of luck, alliance and an occasional punitive expedition.8
As illustrated by the different case studies of local and regional elites in Part 3 
of this volume, this powerful archipelago metaphor is not just a very good ap-
proximation of the situation in West-Asia’s Timurid East. On the ground, in 
and out of the limelight of trans-regional political power, all kinds of constella-
tions of scholars, merchants, bureaucrats and local rural and urban leaders 
participated actively and often equally successfully in the translation and ac-
commodation to local and regional realities of trans-regional claims to power 
and primacy. As will be detailed below, the social, cultural and financial entre-
preneurship of these groups alongside their knowhow and access to all kinds 
of resources made them equally important, powerful and impactful both for 
the highly personalized and tanistric successes of all kinds of Turko-Mongol 
leaderships in West-Asia’s more peripheral zones as well as for (or against) the 
more coherent processes of central state formation in the Ottoman Northwest, 
the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the Timurid East of Islamic 
West-Asia. As it played out in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, Turko- 
Mongol socio-political praxis was therefore not just highly personalized, 
 tanistric and violent. It also displayed a strong tendency towards fluidity and 
 poly-centrism. All these Turko-Mongol qualifications therefore invite one to 
consider West-Asian power as a relational and circulating historical phenom-
enon that connected and disconnected local, regional and trans-regional so-
cial realities in myriad centrifugal and centripetal ways. The growing visibility 
8 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 2.
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of the latter integrative tendencies in some parts of West-Asia should never 
obfuscate the continued workings of the former decentralizing and poly-cen-
tric forces in the peripheries as well as in the centers of the Ottoman, Syro-
Egyptian, Turkmen and Timurid trajectories of state formation.
2.2 Turko-Mongol Political Economies
These diverse local, regional and trans-regional elites were actually connected 
through access to Islamic West-Asia’s many resources in more defining and 
structuring ways than they were through Turko-Mongol socio-political praxis. 
It is therefore also appropriate to give some consideration here to this, and to 
the diverse but related sets of tributary, fiscal and proprietor relationships and 
of redistributive arrangements that distinguished fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia’s political economies. These have to be understood against the back-
ground of a brief contemplation of the region’s wider symbiotic nomadic, agri-
cultural and commercial economies.
The recurrent tendency in Turko-Mongol politics towards “internecine war-
fare” did “minimal damage to a nomadic economy”, as explained Joseph Fletch-
er. “[T]o an agricultural economy, on the other hand”, Fletcher continued, “it 
was destructive, sometimes disastrous”.9 For many centuries, West-Asia’s di-
verse, rich and longstanding agricultural economies had been forced to ac-
commodate the many changes wrought, in more and less destructive ways, by 
the influx of Inner-Asian nomads and their tanistric politics. In the fifteenth 
century, that accommodation continued, due both to the pressures of the 
Turko-Mongol reflux from West to East and the impact of more particular 
socio -economic phenomena, not least the mid-fourteenth-century Black 
Death pandemic and similar, more restricted, epidemic cycles of pestilence, 
plague and depopulation. Throughout Islamic West-Asia, a transhumant no-
madic economy, controlled by Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and many other tribal 
leaderships, had thus come to occupy a much more prominent space, and 
these groups often functionally shared the diverse rural landscapes of the re-
gion with agricultural ventures of a reduced and mostly relatively modest local 
scale. This created a particular trans-regional economic context that, though 
fundamentally different from any earlier trans-regional situation, proved resil-
ient enough to the political realities of endless warfare to maintain a reason-
able level of sufficiency.
An important factor here also was undoubtedly the fact that these symbi-
otic nomadic and agricultural economies were supported by the fifteenth-cen-
tury mercantile networks that increasingly strengthened connections amongst 
9 Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 242.
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and beyond West-Asia’s many long-standing and densely populated urban cen-
ters and towns. This booming business of the circulation of local, regional and 
trans-regional merchants and commodities (including luxury goods such as 
spices and also slaves and furs) had also very successfully adapted to accom-
modate the recurrent political insecurities of the time, operating along 
rhythms of exchange and along flows of resources that managed to produce in 
many ways their own commercial realities.10 On a local level, these realities 
were undoubtedly also volatile, affected by ecological and demographic uncer-
tainties and intersected by all kinds of competing interests that could be 
equally political and economic. Across the board, however, the era’s political 
and economic volatilities did not necessarily mirror each other thanks to the 
resilience of local economic communities as well as their capacity to adapt. 
Many of these communities also empowered themselves by acting as links in 
the intensifying chains of West-Asian routes and towns that connected the 
Mediterranean, Inner Asian and Indian Ocean trade zones. Islamic West-Asia’s 
fifteenth-century cultural efflorescence and its reputation as an age of cultural 
innovation and creativity, and of trans-regional networks of defining scholar-
ship and knowledge practices, are very much testimony to the ways in which 
these changing socio-economic realities had somehow managed to accommo-
date the potentially destructive effects of Turko-Mongol political praxis.
Turko-Mongol political praxis in this post-Temür age, however, had also 
been shaped in many ways by those same socio-economic changes. The afore-
mentioned appanage and tanistry practices of dynastic fragmentation and vio-
lent succession to leadership were not static normative devices that structured 
political action in unchanging or uniform destructive ways. They rather repre-
sented deep-rooted traditions that were constantly being re-invented and re-
imagined according to the necessities of time and space, thus offering many 
potential solutions to all kinds of challenges. This was also true of the chal-
lenges posed by the new political and socio-economic realities of the fifteenth 
century, and of the great variety of more or less successful solutions pursued 
across Islamic West-Asia by the new, or renewed, elites of the post-Temür era. 
This pragmatic interplay between leadership challenges and solutions played 
out most directly on the local level, when political and socio-economic reali-
ties intertwined and Turko-Mongol elites everywhere tried again to tap into 
10 Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne; Inalcik, “Bur-
sa and the Commerce of the Levant”; Inalcik, “Ḥarīr. ii—The Ottoman Empire”; for wider 
commercial (and related political) connections east- and westward, see also Vallet, 
L’Arabie marchande; Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade; Coulon, Barcelone et le 
grand commerce d’Orient.
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the region’s changing flows of resources and accelerating rhythms of exchange. 
The intense and highly interconnected cultural and intellectual life of fifteenth- 
century Islamic West-Asia was very much an outcome of these pragmatic poli-
tics of local revenue extraction, thriving as it had before on the patronage of 
these elites, on the political needs of their competing leaderships, and on the 
many opportunities for others beyond the direct control of these particular 
elites. Cultural and intellectual innovation were stimulated by regional compe-
tition, by the ubiquitous scramble for social distinction and political legitima-
tion, and by the fertile hybridization of Arabo- and Perso-Islamic, Turkic and 
Turko-Mongol lore, and these developments found a welcome partner in the 
West-Asian empowerment of the relatively small groups of highly mobile 
West-Asian power elites of the post-Temür era. Rather than being undermined 
by the era’s continuous outbursts of rivalry and violence, the cultural efflores-
cence of the fifteenth century in many ways was sustained by the constant 
opportunities generated by these endless renegotiations of local, regional and 
trans-regional balances of interest.11
Across fifteenth century West-Asia, Turko-Mongol elites attempted in many 
different ways to tap into the region’s flows of resources and rhythms of ex-
change. Even though fiscal institutional precedents created a semblance of 
uniformity, these attempts were determined by local circumstances as much as 
by trans-local ambitions or centralizing initiatives. The most defining factor in 
all this, so it appears, was actually the changing contingency of a political cen-
ter’s distance from, and level of control over the economic assets in a locality. 
Territories and periods marred by political competition, warfare and cam-
paigns of conquest and redress were hit most forcefully by the potentially de-
structive economic effects of Turko-Mongol politics. In such contexts, harvests, 
livestock, commodities or other resources were invariably looted, and then 
distributed as booty among campaigners and their followers along ad hoc hier-
archies of military investment and political interest. After Temür’s endless 
campaigning, and throughout the fifteenth century, West-Asia’s regions that 
continued to be most regularly plagued by these coercive politics of resource 
extraction were the politically unstable poly-centric zone of Iraq, Diyar Bakr, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Eastern Anatolia and their winter and summer pas-
tures, fertile river basins and multiple commercial networks of towns and 
routes.
11 The Russian historian Vasilij Vladimirovič Bartol’d (1869–1930) already made this point 
regarding Timurid history; in due course it was framed with the label of a Timurid “renais-
sance”, see Barthold, Ulugh-beg; Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran, pp. 4–5.
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In many cases, however, mitigating arrangements between local and cam-
paigning leaderships followed, or forestalled, such economically and politi-
cally disruptive moments. Often, precious gifts were exchanged and tributes in 
cash and kind were pledged to confirm such arrangements, generating alterna-
tive, more controlled mechanisms to provide a return on the investments re-
quired for military campaigning. Depending on the circumstances, and also on 
the extent to which promises could be enforced, such ad hoc settlements be-
tween local and central elites could transform into more structural arrange-
ments, including varieties of what essentially were tax farming engagements. 
Indeed, throughout the fifteenth century, these fluid arrangements arguably 
shaped the majority of economic relationships between local and central elites 
across Islamic West-Asia, appearing from Egypt over Western Anatolia to Tran-
soxiana as the means best suited to balance the continuities of local actors and 
practices against the volatilities of Turko-Mongol politics and socio-economic 
changes. Such arrangements required minimal investments from central elites 
and helped maintain some level of authority over more peripheral social or 
territorial spaces. At the same time, these practices integrated Arab, Turkmen, 
Kurdish or other urban, rural and tribal elites into the authority structures of a 
political center by giving them a stake in the maintenance of political and eco-
nomic order. As suggested above, the nature and extent of those stakes, along-
side the level of integration of local and regional elites, and even the identity of 
that political center remained the object of fierce competition, negotiation 
and transformation throughout the century and across the continent.
More direct and unilateral fiscal systems of resource flow tended to comple-
ment, marginalize or even displace tax farming and tributary arrangements 
in areas that were more stable politically such as Ottoman Anatolia, ‘Turkish’ 
Syro- Egypt or Timurid Khurasan and Transoxiana, as well as in the proximity 
and catchment area of powerful leaders, such as Jahan Shah and Uzun Hasan. 
In each of these West-Asian power centers, broadly similar invasive rural and 
urban tax regimes were in operation, inspired by longstanding local and region-
al fiscal traditions, and leading to greater integration of taxpayers, beneficiaries 
and financial administrators into centralizing economic and political orders. In 
all regions these more direct tax regimes derived from a combination of ancient 
Islamic taxes, most importantly the land tax—or kharaj—and the poll tax—or 
jizya—together with a range of customs duties and related, mostly urban, taxes 
and forced payments that were not similarly sanctified by Muslim scripture. For 
many centuries, especially the kharaj’s tithe payments in cash and kind had 
provided a steady flow of income for the region’s elites, and this did not radi-
cally alter in the fifteenth century. At the same time, however, the period’s 
socio-economic changes certainly also affected the flow of those traditional 
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resources, increasing the importance of other types of income, not least 
through these elites’ fiscal and other forms of participation in West-Asia’s, and 
Eurasia’s, commercial economies.12
The redistribution of these fiscal and related resources among political 
elites in West-Asia was everywhere similarly organized as a regionally inter-
connected and dynamic practice of land tenure and remuneration rooted in a 
mixture of precedents. Most of the economic assets and activities in Islamic 
West-Asia that were somehow subject to more direct tax regimes were con-
nected to lands and rights that legally (at least in theory) belonged to the ruler, 
in his capacity as the personification of the sovereign political order, or the 
state. This proprietorship was then parceled out in fiscal concessions and fiscal 
exemptions to his household, to his courtiers and military leaders, and to other 
relevant beneficiaries in return for their loyalties and services. In the Anatolian 
context the main type of grant in this practice of controlled, but devolved, 
royal remuneration and fiscal administration was known in Ottoman Turkish 
as a timar, and its holders, the timariot, were all cavalrymen (sipahi) with vary-
ing ranks, status and responsibilities. In ‘Turkish’ Syro-Egypt the Arabic noun 
iqtaʿ was used to refer to a concession in the arrangements that organized and 
regulated the distribution of tax income to the Sultanate’s various military 
commanders (amīrs) and their bands of horsemen. In Timurid and Turkmen 
lands similar arrangements prevailed among the entourages of rulers, but 
there these fiscal, administrative and proprietorship grants were referred to as 
soyurghal, or also as tiyul or ulka. The various forms, names and arrangements 
which this prebendal practice took in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asian 
courts were all rooted in shared local customs and traditions that often origi-
nated in the tenth-century history of the region. These forms, names and ar-
rangements also overlapped everywhere in more or less explicit ways with the 
Turko-Mongol appanage practice of shared but segmented authority. Invari-
ably, they confirmed military leaders of Turko-Mongol background in their 
role as receivers and beneficiaries in West-Asia’s fiscal resource flows, as active 
partners and stakeholders in the region’s economies, and as managers of their 
own socio-political, military and economic resources or estates, even during 
moments of accelerating central state formation. All over Islamic West-Asia 
this prebendal practice finally appeared as the normative way of organizing 
the political economy around successful trans-regional leaders and power 
12 This point is especially made in Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en Méditer-
ranée pré-moderne; for a strong argument supporting the idea of very active early Otto-
man participation in the Mediterranean commercial economy, see Fleet, European and 
Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman Empire.
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elites. Bound to be expanded and pushed to the contested social and territorial 
frontiers of these leaders’ effective reach, however, this practice never entirely 
gave way to feudal hierarchies of benefit and service, but rather continuously 
intersected and competed with other arrangements such as centralizing fiscal 
regulations and local tax farming and tributary solutions, alongside alternative 
land tenure provisions, especially those for religious endowments (waqf).13
In order to understand fifteenth-century Turko-Mongol political econo-
mies, it is also extremely relevant to consider in more detail the intersections 
between this multifarious prebendal practice, the latter construction of Mus-
lim religious endowments and centralizing regulations which appeared in 
some of the politically more stabilized parts of West-Asia. The land tenure sys-
tem of fifteenth-century Egypt in particular has been demonstrated to have 
undergone a remarkable transformation, generally identified as waqf-ization. 
This notion of waqf-ization stands for the legal process by which the status of 
taxable land was changed to that of waqf-land, by incorporating the land and 
the income that it generates into the semi-closed, religiously sanctified and 
tax-exempted socio-economic circuit of a religious endowment (waqf). Insti-
tutions for religious practice and education, their salaried staff and students 
and  related forms of expenditure were very often part of this specific socio- 
economic circuit. At the same time, in fifteenth-century Syro-Egypt, such cir-
cuit similarly often included amongst its main beneficiaries specific household 
and family members and the descendants of the private person who created 
the waqf and donated its main assets. For the latter reason in particular, the 
process of waqf-ization has also been likened to a process of de-centralization 
and privatization. Many, if not most, of the Sultanate’s courtiers and political 
leaders, very often also including sultans themselves, pursued all kinds of legal 
and financial strategies to subvert the centralized system of land tenure and 
fiscal redistribution. They alienated state lands traditionally parceled out as 
iqtaʿ and acquired full control over their assets by assigning them to their reli-
gious endowments, and thus to the long-term benefit of particular religious 
institutions and, most importantly, of their family and household. As such, 
waqf-ization was an effective strategy for enabling the Syro-Egyptian Sultan-
ate’s elite families in particular to anticipate, contain and very often also over-
come, at least in socio-economic terms, the volatilities of Turko-Mongol poli-
tics and the many political changes that affected the Sultanate in the fifteenth 
century.14
13 See Inalcik, “Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”.
14 Amīn, Al-Awqāf wa-l-Hayā al-Ijtimāʿīya; Petry, “Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Re-
gime”; Abu Ghazi, Tatawwur al-Ḥiyāza; Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class?”.
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At the same time, however, recent research has begun to make clear that 
this is not just a question of decentralization or of socio-economic privatiza-
tion and survival. It is also a story of a substantial political transformation in 
the fifteenth-century Sultanate. This was due to the fact that, over time, control 
over some of the largest and most profitable waqf-estates in the Syro-Egyptian 
realm was actually transferred back to the central state, in particular to an in-
creasingly clearly defined small number of the highest court offices. Positions 
such as those of the ‘chief commander of the armies’ (atabak al-ʿasakir), ‘se-
nior head guard’ (raʾs nawba kabir), and ‘grand chamberlain’ (hajib hujjab) 
came to be directly associated with the financial management of major waqfs. 
In ways that warrant further research, these major waqfs had often been en-
dowed by previous sultans and they were linked to the upkeep of Cairo’s main 
religious infrastructures, such as the Mansuri hospital, the Ashrafi religious 
complexes inside and outside the city walls, or the Muʾayyadi congregational 
mosque next to the Southern gate. This meant that any military leaders who 
occupied these powerful offices at Cairo’s court also automatically acquired 
control over these important estates and their resources. These leaders were 
then given the opportunity to transfer to their own households the substantial 
surplus generated by these waqf-lands in Egypt and Syria. They thereby moved 
from the administration of one set of waqf-estates to another as they made 
their careers at court and accumulated ever more resources. In the meantime, 
most of these leaders also used the riches they assembled in this way to set 
up  their own religious endowments, continuing the afore-mentioned waqf- 
ization process and working to the socio-economic benefit of their own house-
holds and families.15 In many ways, therefore, the accelerating transformation 
of Egypt’s land tenure system through waqf-ization and the paradoxical re- 
integration of waqf-estates in the state apparatus were related factors. They 
both contributed to, but were also partly generated by, the formation in Cairo 
of a small but particular set of state actors. As will be discussed in more detail 
below, these figures all rose from very humble origins, distinguished them-
selves through many years of military and court service, and eventually man-
aged to accumulate substantial political and economic resources in the pro-
cess. Different sets of these particular state actors, and their huge personalized 
resources, continued to influence successions and the political stability within 
the Sultanate throughout the fifteenth century. A handful of these men, in-
cluding figures such as Jaqmaq (r. 1438–53), Inal (r. 1453–61), Khushqadam 
(r. 1461–7), Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and Qansawh (r. 1501–16), even managed to 
15 Igarashi, Land Tenure and Mamluk Waqfs, esp. pp. 29–32, 42–45; Van Steenbergen & Ter-
monia, “State Formation, Military Entrepreneurship, and Waqfisation”.
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rise to the highest court office of sultan after long careers of service and of re-
source accumulation.
Elsewhere in Islamic West-Asia, the waqf institution also continued to play 
an important role in structuring socio-economic and political relationships. In 
the Ottoman and Timurid territories, as well as in the more fluid zone of East-
ern Anatolia, Armenia, Diyar Bakr, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Iran, this infrastruc-
ture similarly enabled the structural patronage, cultural promotion and politi-
cal integration of wide varieties of particular religio-cultural communities and 
their leaders, followers and practices. In these parts of Islamic West-Asia, the 
waqf institution also provided for a legal and socio-economic mechanism to 
protect elite families, households and other social groups against the vicissi-
tudes of Turko-Mongol politics. However, only some of these endowments 
were integrated or linked with the political apparatus of these regions’ rulers. 
As semi-closed local or regional circuits of agricultural, manufactural and 
commercial estates and assets, of expenditure for specific religious and com-
munal purposes, of sovereign provisions prescribed by Islamic scripture and 
the law, as well as of rural and urban expertise, the majority of waqf endow-
ments in Islamic West-Asia actually operated as an alternative, unusually sta-
ble, set of socio-economic arrangements for various elite groups to participate 
in the endless negotiations of local and regional relationships and balances of 
power. The semi-closed, sovereign and communal character of the waqf insti-
tution actually made it into a very powerful centrifugal instrument in the 
hands of power elites. It facilitated the intersection of centripetal ambitions 
and relationships emanating from Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul, from Tabriz, 
Herat, and Samarkand, and even from Cairo and Damascus with other equal-
ly  powerful, institutionalized relationships, which had substantial socio- 
economic, cultural as well as political impact on a local or regional level. As 
explained above, in fifteenth-century Cairo this centrifugal dynamic was 
somehow complemented by a more constructive participation of waqf endow-
ments in the state formation process. In the East, Timurid rulers and their en-
tourages started pursuing a parallel re-integration and more centripetal opera-
tionalization of the waqf (vaqf in Persian) institution within the politics of the 
central court.16 In Anatolia, however, the Ottoman state pursued a different 
policy, changing the legal status of rural properties and endowments (vakıf in 
Ottoman Turkish), or even seizing them. This happened to increasing numbers 
16 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, esp. Chapter Five: “Piety and Pragmatism: the Role of the 
Islamic Endowment” (pp. 148–191); McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia, esp. Chapters Two 
(‘The Origins of the ʿAlid Shrine at Balkh’) and Three (‘Waqf in its Political Setting’) 
(pp. 21–70).
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of rural properties and endowments belonging to groups and families in vari-
ous parts of Western, Central and eventually even Eastern Anatolia. This forced 
expansion of the Anatolian land tenure system under direct Ottoman control 
was actually part and parcel of the process of centralization that followed sul-
tan Mehmed’s (r. 1451–81) conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Many local Ana-
tolian elites’ privately-owned and waqf lands were transferred to become Otto-
man state lands (miri). They thus ended up as property of the Ottoman sultan 
in his capacity as the personification of the Ottoman political order and were 
parceled out as timars to the sultan’s cavalry elites, the sipahi, or these lands 
were at least tied to a requirement of some form of military service from its 
original proprietors. In the process of the formation of the Ottoman state in 
the fifteenth century, therefore, it were the radical annihilation of the waqf in-
stitution’s atomistic and even centrifugal dynamic as well as the maximization 
of the timar system as a function of the expansion of the dynasty’s military 
apparatus that were the main targets of the central Ottoman court’s socio- 
economic policy.17
2.3 Turko-Mongol Political Apparatuses
These diverse redistributive arrangements in the political economies of Islam-
ic West-Asia were all also interrelated as far as the administrative and authority 
structures that appeared to organize them are concerned. At this point it is 
therefore necessary also to briefly outline the organizational appearances of 
Turko-Mongol political power in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia and to 
consider their differing levels of complexity and penetration in and beyond 
the main centers of Ottoman, Syro-Egyptian, Turkmen and Timurid power, 
and also to explore how they transformed throughout the century.
As suggested above, these organizational arrangements all operated along 
devolved and even atomistic modes of power and control that remind us of the 
appanage practices of Turko-Mongol politics. These arrangements and their 
varying degrees of political integration often also coalesced with those prac-
tices and provided them with a more structured, institutionalized, appearance. 
Most of the princes, courtiers, military commanders, cavalrymen and other 
urban, rural and tribal leaders and elite communities of fifteenth century Is-
lamic West-Asia were all very much left to their own devices with regards to 
organizing access management for the resources they controlled or which had 
been assigned to them. Even holders of a timar, an iqtaʿ and a soyurghal had to 
attend to their own economic and military needs and responsibilities, and they 
17 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 126–131; Inalcik, “Au-
tonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”, pp. 118, 124.
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mostly did so in organizational formats that appeared like down-scaled ver-
sions of trans-regional rulers’ courts and administrations.
This segmentation of how fiscal relationships were organized in fifteenth-
century Islamic West-Asia, even in the vicinities of strong rulers and expanding 
states, is another function of the personalized nature of Turko-Mongol politics. 
The remaining instability and volatility of political realities across the region 
regularly cut across processes of more intense trans-local political integration 
and subordination of elites, even in the more stabilizing political orders of the 
Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the 
Timurid East. In the latter statist contexts especially, leaders continued to pur-
sue a more coherent administrative level of integration and central control 
through the enforcement of particular regulations, such as the temporary and 
non-hereditary allocation of prebendal grants, the assignment of territorially 
dispersed prebendal lands, the rapid transfer of grant holders between estates, 
or alternative remunerations from central repositories. However, centrifugal 
tendencies to subvert these regulations remained equally strong, as in the 
waqf-ization process, as well as more generally in the atomistic and diverse 
practical organization of the management of grants, tax farms, tributes, en-
dowments and estates. For this reason, the costs of enforcing these regulations 
for central authorities often proved extremely high. As a result, rulers and elites 
throughout fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia continued to favor a diversity 
of ad hoc and middle-ground solutions serving a variety of local and central-
izing needs and interests, even in the increasingly stable contexts of the Syro-
Egyptian and Ottoman Sultanates.18
Overall during this period, these devolved, segmented and negotiated ways 
of organizing fiscal relationships were actually part and parcel of the rather 
light and messy wider arrangements that accompanied the political fortunes 
of the region’s Turko-Mongol rulers, dynasties and power elites. Just like redis-
tributive practices, these organizational arrangements throughout the region 
were rooted in various hazy combinations of longstanding bureaucratic prec-
edents, local managerial requirements and particular types of expertise and 
opportunity. Basically, every man of status and every leader high or low had to 
find his own solutions to the challenges of collecting and paying his dues, of 
communicating with sovereigns, peers and subordinates, and of safeguarding 
his patrimony. Across the region, solutions to these challenges were largely 
18 Inalcik, “Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States”; Inalcik’s attempt to create a better sense 
of the meanings and roles of “Temlîks, Soyurghals, Yurdluḳ-Ocaḳlıks, Mâlikâne-Muḳāṭaʿas 
and Awqāf” certainly leaves the reader with this impression of diversity and ad hoc 
solutions.
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determined by local circumstances, as well as by regional and historical condi-
tions, and, above all, by the sliding scale of a man’s power. Here, both person-
alized politics and volatile political realities defined the level of complexity of 
organizational challenges and their solutions as well as, importantly, the com-
position, size and fate of the administrative and military staff supporting a 
leader in his duties.
Everywhere, relationships of power, whatever their level of complexity and 
authority, coalesced around basic organizational units of groups of people 
bound together through multivalent sets of personalized ties. As in preceding 
centuries, these bonds ranged from various kinship arrangements to mutual 
loyalties acquired through social action. As far as the diverse Turko-Mongol 
leaderships of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia are concerned, there was a 
range of more or less structured formats in which these organizational units of 
people and social ties could appear, depending on a man’s power. Peripatetic 
warbands of military leaders and their associates and personal retainers were 
one, often more short-lived, format that continued to make its mostly violent 
appearance in particular in Islamic West-Asia’s frontier zones and peripheries. 
Urbanized households of sultans, princes, courtiers and their personal body-
guards, women, children, servants and administrators were another, heavily 
structured format, occupying the other extreme on this continuum of core re-
lationships of power.19 In the devolved, segmented and negotiated realities of 
fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, most relational power constellations wa-
vered in dynamic ways between these two extremes of social complexity. As 
suggested above, only a handful of these constellations attained and main-
tained a high level of organizational complexity, transforming with varying 
levels of success into the region’s central courts in Cairo, Constantinople, Ta-
briz, Herat and Samarkand.
Throughout Islamic West-Asia, scribes (Ar. katib, pl. kuttab) of various prov-
enance and expertise were hired to perform duties of tax collection, of house-
hold and military expenditure, and of letter writing in Arabic and Persian (and, 
increasingly, Turkish) for these diverse power constellations. Whenever, and 
wherever, the scale of a patron’s power required it, specialization and diversifi-
cation generated, or regenerated, more complex administrations. This process 
involved the structuration of larger sets of scribes and their different tasks fol-
lowing the ancient bureaucratic unit of the diwan and along hierarchies topped 
by traditional positions such as that of the vizier (Ar. wazir) or its Persian or 
Turko-Mongol equivalents. Similar processes affected the military entourages 
19 Crossley, “Military Patronage and Hodgson’s Genealogy of State Centralization in Early 
Modern Eurasia”, pp. 105–108.
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of West-Asia’s rulers and leaders, with each patron having in their service fight-
ers of various provenance and expertise ranging from tribal levies over merce-
naries to military slaves and freedmen, and from horsemen to footmen. The 
occasional expansion of these fighters’ ranks also led these services to special-
ize, diversify and subscribe to structural military precedents, including that of 
hierarchies of commanders known as amirs (in Arabic and Persian) or begs (in 
Turkish). In the course of the fifteenth century, as will be detailed below, this 
process of growing organizational complexity marked the history of Ottoman, 
‘Turkish’ and Timurid leaderships and their courts in Western Anatolia, Egypt 
and Eastern Iran. It also happened to a certain extent in the entourages of oth-
er powerful leaders in the more unstable and peripheral frontier zone that con-
nected Eastern Anatolia, Iraq and Azerbaijan.
In Egypt, as elsewhere in West-Asia, this process of bureaucratic specializa-
tion and diversification had actually been ongoing with ups and downs for sev-
eral centuries. Following long-standing regional traditions of Arabic writing on 
epistolary and accountancy practices, this process’ trajectory during the fif-
teenth century, in the service of the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate, was captured and re-
produced in a handful of very detailed and informative literary texts. Describ-
ing the rules and regulations of the Sultanate’s court and power apparatus, 
these books were written by scribes as manuals and as instruments both of the 
Sultanate’s bureaucratic practice and of that practice’s structural coherence 
across time and space. In these literary repositories of fifteenth-century proto-
col and epistolary modelling the Sultanate’s apparatus actually appears as far 
from light. Indeed, these texts rather portray a powerful and coherent bureau-
cratic structure set up to penetrate and organize local power relationships as 
efficiently as possible. This impressive contemporary appearance has substan-
tially informed many modern imaginations about the Sultanate, painting a 
picture of a highly rationalized bureaucratic state, organized and performed 
along a neatly devised triple hierarchy of ‘the men of the sword, the men of the 
pen and the men of the turbans’. In modern scholarship, these contemporary 
categories are generally referred to as the ‘military-executive’, the ‘financial-
secretarial’, and the ‘judiciary office holders’ of ‘the Mamluk government’.20 
Furthermore, in modern Ottoman studies there is an equally widespread tradi-
tion to understand the Ottoman Sultanate in the later fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries as a similarly intrusive bureaucratic state. This mainly followed from 
the fact that from the early sixteenth century onwards, this state began to leave 
an impressive paper trail not just in comparable manuals and administrative 
20 Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, pp. 90–110.
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repositories, but also in uniquely preserved archival records. In fact, variations 
of this bureaucratic type of state appeared for a long time as a norm in modern 
scholarship that could be used to understand, evaluate and compare political 
organizations across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, especially in Egypt 
and West Anatolia and to some extent also in Timurid Khurasan, as more or 
less successful prequels of the region’s early modern empires.
As will be detailed in the next chapter, since the early 1990s some scholars 
are also pointing to the pitfalls of teleology and anachronism in argumenta-
tions such as these, and alternative interpretations of the actual nature and 
meaning of bureaucratic practice and of bureaucratization in a context of 
Turko-Mongol politics are gradually being formulated. Considering the vio-
lent, volatile and personalized nature of those politics across the region, in-
cluding in fifteenth-century Egypt, current scholarship is now certainly also 
contemplating the possibility that administrative texts and political realities 
could be two very different things. Indeed, the former texts may well have been 
one of the tools available to scribes and to their patrons to pursue more stable 
participation in, and control over, the fluidity of the latter realities in the face 
of continuous challenges. This approach tallies not just much better with what 
is known about fifteenth-century Turko-Mongol politics, but also with data 
from many other contemporary sources which points to the often incoherent 
and ad hoc nature of bureaucratic practice and also hints at the rather more 
limited success of central bureaucracy’s penetration of local communities 
across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. As suggested by the competitive 
nature of Turko-Mongol organizational arrangements, the structural integra-
tion of elites in centralizing sets of relationships was frequently contested, and 
the integration of diverse local and regional administrative practices and ac-
tors in centralizing claims to authority remained a haphazard enterprise. Wher-
ever in Islamic West-Asia the scale of a leadership’s power enabled administra-
tive and military specialization and diversification, physical and political 
distance nonetheless continued to define, and confine, the extent of a locality’s 
bureaucratic penetration by the center and its organizational arrangements. 
Just as with the politics of fiscal administration, the administration of central 
authority in this wider sense also continuously intersected and competed with 
all kinds of local, alternative or rival authority arrangements. The combination 
of a need for costly investments of people and resources to face these challeng-
es, alongside the infrastructural limitations of surveillance and  communication, 
and also the volatility of Turko-Mongol politics and the recurrent recalibration 
of central powers in fifteenth-century West-Asia, all meant that substantial dis-
tances continued to separate political actors. All this reflects above all a 
 historical reality of socio-political segmentation and of local continuity and 
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 empowerment that was not easy to integrate into, let alone control with cen-
tralizing bureaucratic arrangements, ambitions and apparatuses.
In fact, as suggested by Manz’ archipelago metaphor above, West-Asia’s inte-
gration into the orbits of its main political centers in the fifteenth century re-
mained a contested and diverse reality which often involved the ad hoc action 
of military agents and local representatives. Irrespective of West-Asia’s diverse 
ecological systems, administrative penetration and integration were therefore 
primarily limited to the main urban centers and towns and their hinterlands 
and to the upholding of interrelated, but also locally accommodated, urban 
systems of taxation and justice. This urban prioritization can be seen most 
forcefully in the concentration of military and administrative representatives 
and agents of central courts, as governors, commanders, judges, scribes and tax 
collectors, in many of the urban centers and towns of Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Khurasan and Transoxiana. As explained be-
fore, this presence had a mixed impact on local relationships of power, de-
pending on distances and loyalties, on central investments of expensive re-
sources, and on all kinds of different local complexities. Wherever any urban 
penetration was achieved, however, the core business of any political appara-
tus was to focus on tapping into local resource flows via fiscal and other ar-
rangements, the maintenance of social order to assure the steady flow of those 
resources, and at best also some local performance of the central court’s claims 
to sovereignty and political order.
Any assessment of the nature of this central penetration of local relation-
ships of power is complicated by not just the structuring bias of Arabic, Persian, 
and Turkish administrative textbooks, but also the general paucity of docu-
mentary and non-urban sources for the political history of fifteenth- century 
Islamic West-Asia. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, however, another 
important set of bureaucratic texts emerged in Aq Qoyunlu and Ottoman con-
texts. These texts confirm in many ways this rather narrow bureaucratic focus 
on local urban systems of taxation and justice as outlined above. The sources in 
question are the interrelated Law Books (Kanun Name) of Uzun Ḥasan and of 
the Ottoman sultan Bayezid.21 As Ottomanist Rhoads Murphey explains for the 
latter case, these and a related handful of surviving documents and texts con-
firm indeed that
it was from the narrow base of the more closely regulated urban space 
and urban markets that the Ottomans launched their first and most effec-
tive efforts aimed at modifying undesired market tendencies such as 
21 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, pp. 244–251; Woods, The Aq Qoyunlu, pp. 108–109.
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hoarding and price speculation, and at creating the basis for a fair bal-
ance between mercantile profit and affordability for average urban 
consumers.22
These Law Books integrated various local customary arrangements, comple-
menting more general doctrinal regulations and legal advice formulated by 
specialists of religious law who tended to operate within alternative authority 
frameworks. As such, these Law Books announced comprehensive regulatory 
codification projects of later Ottoman sultans, but certainly did not mirror 
them. They actually pursued a more active central participation in particular 
local social, commercial and fiscal arrangements and solutions by proscribing 
and regulating the agency of the ruler’s own local agents and representatives. 
The production of these specimens of royal codification towards the end of 
the fifteenth century are therefore above all rare extant functions of the 
growth, specialization and diversification of the entourages of Uzun Hasan 
and Bayezid as these were trying to organize the expanding horizons of these 
rulers’ power.
In this way these Law Books actually only represent one particular moment 
in the formation and empowerment of such entourages and political appara-
tuses. Similarly formalized communication between courts and their agents 
in the form of decrees, orders, diplomas, missives, letters and reports—most 
of which have not been preserved—were integral to bureaucratic expansion 
throughout fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, performing political authority 
as much as negotiating it. Other equally important aspects of this growth and 
expansion included all kinds of regulatory efforts, including the maintenance 
of social order and the ensuring of justice, related both to fifteenth-century 
West-Asian rulers’ symbolic apparatus as well as the daily performance of their 
claims to sovereignty and resources and therefore often recorded in contempo-
rary narrative texts of history. Modern scholarship has even made the convinc-
ing case regarding the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate that the ruler and his bureau-
cratic agents managed to appropriate legal and judicial authorities traditionally 
only invested in more autonomous specialists of religious law.23 This remark-
able expansion of the authority of the sultan of Cairo and of his bureaucratic 
apparatus appears not to have been achieved by any other ruler in fifteenth- 
century Islamic West-Asia. Nevertheless, many certainly also deployed, or 
22 Murphey, “The Ottoman Economy in the early imperial age”, pp. 28–30, esp. 28.
23 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law”.
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pursued, similar strategies of growth, penetration and judicial empowerment 
in their own, more or less successful, ways.24
3 Situating Trajectories of State Formation in Islamic West-Asia
In the wide range of predominantly urban bureaucratic practices, fifteenth-
century leaders and their agents generally seem to have prioritized concerns 
for power and control over any expectations about the performance of govern-
ment and of specific administrative tasks.25 This prioritization involved first 
and foremost the power, control and level of local or regional participation of 
the leader or ruler in whose service an administrative and military apparatus 
operated. However, in many, if not all, cases it also involved the power and 
control that could be acquired by the bureaucrats themselves, and that could 
be wielded by scribes, by military commanders and by all kinds of other agents 
in the leader’s service. Closeness and direct service to the ruler in varieties of 
advisory, financial, military, diplomatic, ceremonial or other capacities were 
certainly one strategic means by which an agent could acquire power and con-
trol, indeed this was a very important tool amidst the returning realities of 
Turko-Mongol personalized politics. But in certain political contexts, these ca-
pacities could also be transformed into power and control in other, more au-
tonomous, and therefore also more structural ways. Whenever the scale of a 
leadership’s political reach in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia enabled bu-
reaucratic specialization and diversification, this also generated a lengthening 
of the virtual chains of authority and agency between a ruler and the increas-
ing numbers of agents performing his rule. From these agents’ perspective, 
with greater complexity thus also came a relative depersonalization of the ties 
that bound them to their ruler. This was accompanied by the transformation of 
the ruler from a mere powerful person into a more abstract idea and represen-
tation of correct political order. This form of state formation therefore brought 
24 See Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law”, for a wider, comparative consider-
ation of the relationship between Turko-Mongol dynasts and Islamic law in the late me-
dieval and early modern period, suggesting that “different dynasties’ adopting a particular 
Islamic school of law as their official state school […] [represented] active attempts by the 
ruling dynasty to regulate the school’s structures, authorities, and doctrines” (p. 580) and 
that at least in the Ottoman case this process of expansion of dynastic authority began in 
the early fifteenth century and is especially notable from the sixteenth century onwards.
25 Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamluk Period”; see also Chapter Two in this vol-
ume, especially “Introduction: Defining the ‘state’ between Max Weber, ʿAbd al- Rahman 
Ibn Khaldun, and Charles Tilly”.
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greater autonomy for those along the chain who were trained, skilled and ex-
perienced in the maintenance, reproduction and expansion of that order, re-
sulting in a remarkably symbiotic interaction between an agent’s own empow-
erment and that of the leadership he served.26
As suggested before, this classic state formation process of the mutual em-
powerment of a bureaucratic apparatus and of a centralizing political order 
topped by a particular leadership emerged especially in fifteenth-century Is-
lamic West-Asia in the Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the 
Timurid East and eventually also the Turkmen North. In each of these particu-
lar leadership contexts it did so only in qualified and circumscribed ways, as 
trans-regionally competing (and hence also co-constitutive) phenomena that 
were predominantly urban-centered realities and that were continuously chal-
lenged, intersected and renegotiated. Furthermore, the different leaderships of 
the more peripheral frontier zone in between these stabilizing political spaces 
also experienced an overlapping variety of more and less parallel moments of 
symbiotic empowerment. In all regions, military successes and expansions led 
by Turko-Mongol leaderships certainly generated some form of bureaucratic 
growth, diversification, specialization and state formation. In many cases, 
however, the same kinds of ongoing military action could also easily thwart 
this process of central or regional consolidation, and cause its regular regres-
sion to more personalized and contested relationships of power.
Having considered the general contours of fifteenth-century Islamic West-
Asia’s politics, its power elites and its Turko-Mongol practices and institutions, 
let us now turn to a more specific interpretation of these patterns of state for-
mation and transformation, in particular of the dynamics that appear to have 
defined these patterns throughout this long century in the Ottoman, Syro-
Egyptian and Timurid-Turkmen contexts. The main historical dynamics that 
will be discussed here reflect convergences of key features of West-Asian state 
formation that distinguish the fifteenth century while at the same time mark-
ing its trans-dynastic entanglement. These include the contingency of central-
izing longevity, the integration of distant power elites through multivalent pro-
cesses of bureaucratic growth, the specificity of elite renewal by outsiders to 
West-Asian political realities, and the reproduction of central bureaucratic 
elites in highly competitive as well as parallel and continuous ways.
3.1 The Politics of Longevity
In the Ottoman, ‘Turkish’ and Timurid-Turkmen contexts, one of the main fac-
tors that tended to check the fragmentation of power constellations so typical 
26 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “The Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?”.
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of Turko-Mongol politics was the contingency of an easily forgotten phenom-
enon that will be named ‘centralizing longevity’ here. Fully in line with the 
nature of Turko-Mongol politics, it actually was a personalized type of central-
izing longevity that seems to have generated almost paradoxically more deper-
sonalized processes of bureaucratic diversification, specialization and state 
formation in most of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s political centers. This type 
concerned the longevity of personal rule, when a ruler’s military and political 
successes were long-lasting, over time generating the appearance of his reign 
as pertaining to a natural order of things. This longevity of personal rule cre-
ated a charismatic political authority that somehow transcended and con-
tained recurrent warfare and fragmentation while at the same time stimulat-
ing bureaucratic growth and state formation. Between 1421 and 1512 the 
Ottoman Sultanate was led by just three powerful rulers, who each reigned 
successively for some thirty years: Murad (r. 1421–44, 1446–51), his son Mehmed 
(r. 1444–46, 1451–81) and his grandson Bayezid (r. 1481–1512). This remarkable 
continuity of leadership was certainly one of several factors that facilitated a 
more or less persistent symbiotic interaction between these rulers’ empower-
ment and that of new groups from their expanding, diversifying and special-
izing entourages. There occurred similar continuities and processes of symbi-
otic interaction, gradual empowerment and bureaucratic growth in Timurid 
contexts, especially during the long reigns of Shah Rukh (r. 1409/1416–47) 
and  then of Sultan-Abu Saʿid (r. 1451/1459–69) and Sultan-Husayn Bayqara 
(r.  1469–1506) in the East. To certain extents, these multivalent phenomena of 
Turko-Mongol state formation eventually also accompanied various other 
Turkmen experiences of long, successful and expanding personal rule, such as 
with the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Jahan Shah (r. 1439–67), with his Aq Qoyunlu suc-
cessor Uzun Ḥasan (r. 1457–78) or with the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg (r. ca. 1423–
64). The fifteenth century in Islamic West Asia was thus certainly an era marked 
by both a remarkable set of long reigns and a variety of processes of state for-
mation at the same time. Unlike in the Ottoman case, however, Turkmen, 
Karamanid and even Timurid forms of state formation in West-Asia’s frontier 
zone never entirely managed to contain the detrimental effects of Turko-Mon-
gol politics. The persistence of bureaucratic staff and practices certainly en-
sured some forms of stability, continuity and state formation in the face of the 
violent dynastic transitions from Shah Rukh to Sultan-Abu Saʿid and then Sul-
tan-Husayn or to Jahan Shah and then Uzun Hasan in Iran and Azerbaijan, and 
from Karamanid to Ottoman sovereignty in Southern Anatolia. Nevertheless, 
such transitions after the disappearance of strong leaders were also always 
marked by the radical fragmentation, subordination or even annihilation of 
Timurid, Turkmen or Karamanid political authorities and power elites.
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In contrast, this never happened in any similarly destructive ways within the 
Ottoman dynasty or for the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate in the fifteenth century, at 
least not after the first years of the century. Following Temür’s violent passages, 
these years had in both cases indeed been marked by a similarly radical loss of 
political authority, central control and coherence. In Cairo a kind of centrip-
etal institutional force actually enabled the containment and then, throughout 
the fifteenth century, the stabilization and structuration of this recurrent cen-
trifugal dynamic in the format of the Sultanate’s own successful trajectory of 
state formation. In the course of their long careers of military service, resource 
building (including through waqf-ization) and political leadership, the afore-
mentioned successive sets of fifteenth-century state actors in Cairo decided 
successions to the sultanate and could even themselves rise to that position. As 
such they were both the products and the performers of that trajectory of con-
tinued bureaucratic growth, centripetal empowerment and political structura-
tion, as Kristof D’hulster also suggests in Chapter 3 of this volume. At the same 
time the Sultanate’s political elites, including these actors, continued to face 
regular and violent fragmentation in the context of succession struggles and 
other variants of Turko-Mongol internecine warfare. Unlike what happened 
among their Timurid or Turkmen peers, however, between 1412 and 1517 this 
never had any similarly destabilizing effects in the Sultanate on its territorial 
or socio-political coherence. This remarkable situation of bureaucratic growth 
and state formation in the face of endemic political violence and conflict in 
many ways was both a result and also a contributing factor of a kind of institu-
tional inertia. This inertia was above all informed by the institutional longev-
ity of the Sultanate in Cairo, which was unique, at least for fifteenth-century 
West-Asia. The Sultanate in Cairo originated with the Muslim championships 
of Saladin in the later twelfth and of a handful of mamlūk sultans in the thir-
teenth centuries and, as a site of trans-regional power, arguably even with their 
predecessors in Cairo since the tenth century. It was this institutional longevity 
and subsequent inertia that stimulated, irrespective of any divergent realities, 
the reproduction of the coherent, timeless and natural appearance of the Sul-
tanate’s political order in the aforementioned administrative texts as well as in 
all kinds of other contemporary imaginations and performances.
Nowhere else in post-Temür Islamic West-Asia were there any similarly 
longstanding and awe-inspiring continuities in Muslim sites, institutions, val-
ues and resources of power that could be claimed to complement and consoli-
date recurrent moments of personal centralizing longevity and its structuring 
effects on relationships of power. Nevertheless, all the fifteenth century’s 
Turko-Mongol leaderships regularly, and successfully, appealed to ideas of in-
stitutional continuity with local or regional Turko-Mongol, Perso-Islamic and 
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other precedents. However, in the Ottoman case only the returning instability 
of Turko-Mongol political practices was also contained by another form of 
institutional longevity, contributing to a specifically Ottoman trajectory of 
state formation. This trajectory arguably only really took off when, after the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453, another powerful type of centripetal in-
stitutional inertia started contributing to the effects of many years of success-
ful Ottoman leadership. For sultan Mehmed and his successors, the ancient 
imperial metropolis of Constantinople, with its wide-ranging appeal to politi-
cal, cultural and socio-economic imaginations on an incomparable Eurasian 
scale, soon proved a structuring site of power that rivaled Cairo’s role, both as 
a stabilizing centripetal factor within the Sultanate and a valuable regional 
metropolis at the pinnacle of Islamic West-Asia’s hierarchies of power. Otto-
man political authority continued to face ongoing disruptive political chal-
lenges, such as the threat posed between 1481 and 1495 by sultan Bayezid’s 
brother, the refugee contestant for the throne Jem Sultan, or the struggle for 
succession between Bayezid’s sons Korkud, Ahmed and Selim between 1511 
and 1512. Yet during all this time, the Ottoman political order and its expand-
ing number of agents, proved more than capable of securing the appearance 
of coherent political continuity and of avoiding the fate of Timurids, Karama-
nids or of many other Turkmen dynasties.
3.2 The Politics of Distant Integration
Whether cut short by the disruptive realities of Turko-Mongol politics or suf-
ficiently embedded through different types of longevity to survive any such 
disruptions, there were various trajectories of state formation that made a 
marked contribution to the political landscape of fifteenth-century Islamic 
West-Asia. Above all, these trajectories with their differing institutional quali-
ties and quantities brought various levels of political autonomy to those in-
volved in the region’s complex chains of authority and agency, including to all 
kinds of non Turko-Mongol and non-military elites. In many areas of West-
Asia, state formation thus offered a channel to integrate, in more than merely 
coercive ways, extant local political, administrative and military elites and elite 
arrangements into the expanding order of a successful center of Turko-Mongol 
power. It is all too easy to forget this phenomenon of the distant, occasionally 
resource-intensive and violent, and mutually-empowering integration of local 
leaderships into the bureaucratic apparatus of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s 
more successful political orders. These different local elites and the politics of 
their political integration are equally important aspects of the trajectories of 
state formation in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. It is therefore relevant 
to consider them here in some more detail too.
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As mentioned before the process of political structuration through bureau-
cratic growth engaged various urban elites in particular within expanding 
power relations of a centripetal and simultaneously locally accommodated 
nature. From Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt and Gaza, Jerusalem, Damascus, 
Homs, Hama, Tripoli and Aleppo in Syria, and from Bursa, Iznik, Sinop, Konya, 
Ankara, Amasya, Sivas, Kayseri and Amid in Anatolia and Tabriz, Mosul, Bagh-
dad and Basra in Azerbaijan and Iraq, to Isfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Herat, 
Samarkand and Bukhara in the regions of Iran, Khurasan and Transoxiana, 
West-Asia’s diverse and fragmented urban realities were not only dominated 
by interrelated and competing local and regional social formations and their 
overlapping varieties of kinship, communal identity and professional special-
ization. The arenas of intense social interaction which gave birth to these and 
many more urban centers and towns in West-Asia’s ancient urban networks 
were also shaped by more or less successful attempts at urban participation 
through bureaucratic expansion and integration by various, often competing, 
Turko-Mongol power centers.27 Again, the urban penetration of these centers 
in this manner was extremely diverse and multivalent across time and space, 
defined by physical and social distances as well as by sliding scales of Turko-
Mongol power and success. Moreover, even where that penetration was most 
successful, not all urban groups were necessarily touched by it in the same way, 
and not all local urban elites, including Coptic accountants in Egypt, adminis-
trative experts from various sectarian communities in Syria, Anatolia and Iraq, 
or Persianate scribes and scholars across West-Asia, were necessarily similarly 
transformed into bureaucratic agents of a political center’s interests. However, 
as also suggested by Patrick Wing’s and Georg Christ’s case studies of different 
merchant families and communities in Part 3 of this volume, many local actors 
went through an integrative process such as that of state formation and there-
by became more deeply involved in the era’s expanding political orders. Some 
certainly also became active shareholders in those political orders, as uphold-
ers of longstanding specialist solutions at the same time as being local or even 
regional political leaders.
Parallel to these urban technocrats and notables, Islamic West-Asia’s rural 
and tribal elites were also in one or another way affected by the fifteenth 
century’s trajectories of state formation. Actually, along the many, constantly 
changing, fringes of the century’s intricate political orders many figures, in-
cluding all kinds of Arab, Turkmen and other tribal leaderships and marsher 
27 Lantschner, “Fragmented Cities in the Later Middle Ages”.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:27:03PM
via free access
Van Steenbergen60
<UN>
lords, chose to be integrated into the bureaucratic apparatus of a political cen-
ter in order to both contribute to the idea of the trans-regional expansion of 
that center’s political order and to generate local distinctions through the so-
cial power of trans-local titles, paraphernalia and connections. Military service 
in particular continued to generate power in all trajectories of state formation, 
but the wider the distance separating these local military agents from the ex-
panding political center, the more symbolic any obligations related to that ser-
vice were, and the more local and centrifugal their power was. The atomistic, 
segmented and fickle realities of power relationships across fifteenth-century 
West-Asia, and the urban bias present in the more successful trajectories of 
state formation meant that such political distances with (semi-)nomadic lead-
erships in particular remained substantial. As a result, local instrumental-
izations of any form of integration into the bureaucratic growth of regional 
 centers—including also various arrangements that favored new leaderships, 
or new parties within extant leaderships—often prevailed over any more cen-
tripetal dynamic and over any form of bureaucratic penetration. Across the 
board such penetration was at times still considered necessary, particularly in 
ad hoc contexts of disputes over taxation and tribute, in the face of safety is-
sues concerning the circulation of goods and people, and when there were 
changes to the perceived balance of trans-regional powers. In these cases, pen-
etration mostly happened in the format of diplomatic exchanges and punitive 
expeditions which aimed to restore the local appreciation of a center’s coer-
cive power and to recalibrate its troubled relations with local elites. However, 
these exchanges and expeditions always represented occasional, temporary 
and expensive investments of financial and human resources in the intensifi-
cation of particular sets of political relationships, and as such these missions 
and expeditions into West-Asia’s diverse rural and nomadic areas always re-
mained hazardous enterprises, at best generating only uneven and transient 
outcomes. Sometimes they even contributed to the empowerment of new lo-
cal groups and individuals, and often carried within them the seeds of subse-
quent expeditions. Throughout the century and the region, they never gave 
way easily to more systematic reductions of political distances or to wider 
structural forms of integration in the state apparatus.28
28 For examples of this phenomenon, see Wing, “Submission, Defiance, and the Rules of 
Politics”; Garcin, “Note sur les rapports entre bédouins et fallahs”. On these atomistic and 
also distant power relationships across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, see further-
more the (very different) local examples engaged with in Binbaş, “Did the Hurufis Mint 
Coins?” (for the Anatolian region of Erzincan) and in Walker, “The ‘Disappearing’ Villages 
of Late Medieval Jordan” (for the Transjordanian region in Southern Syria).
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This type of distant, occasionally resource-intensive and violent, and mutu-
ally empowering integration of local leaderships into the bureaucratic appara-
tus of fifteenth-century West-Asia’s more successful political orders was deci-
sive for political relationships above all in the poly-centric zone that stretched 
from Azerbaijan and Iraq to Anatolia. It marked the unsteady political rela-
tionships that connected many petty lords and rulers in this more peripheral 
zone to the competing trans-regional trajectories of Ottoman, ‘Turkish’ and 
Timurid state formation. As John Meloy reminds us in his contribution to Part 
3 of this volume, this was also true for the elites of the Hijaz on the Arabian 
peninsula, controlling the sacred centers of Mecca and Medina both in the 
name of the Sultan of Cairo and as powerful but contested patrons of local 
communities.29 In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Timurid disap-
pearance in Western Iran and the trans-regional empowerment of Jahan Shah 
Qara Qoyunlu and then Uzun Ḥasan Aq Qoyunlu, obviously re-oriented many 
relationships. Nevertheless, Eastern Anatolia in particular remained a genuine 
frontier zone, where trans-regional authorities were disputed, where political 
distances appeared as substantial, and where ambitions to stabilize or even 
structure political relationships continued to be resource-intensive and haz-
ardous enterprises. Important moments here include the decisive victory of 
the Ottoman sultan Mehmed over Uzun Ḥasan in 1473 at the battle of Bashkent 
in the Anatolian East and the Ottoman conquest of the Karamanid capital of 
Konya in the South in 1468. These would prove key moments for the particular 
transformation towards a more structural Ottoman penetration of Anatolian 
power relationships.30 Nevertheless, Karamanids, their local tribal supporters, 
Aq Qoyunlu followers and many other Anatolian groups continued to chal-
lenge and subvert that penetration after the end of the fifteenth century, as did 
competitors for trans-regional authority from Cairo and Tabriz. In fact, the 
hugely expensive and mostly ineffective military confrontations between 1485 
and 1491 in Southern Anatolia between the troops of Mehmed’s successor 
Bayezid and those of the Sultan of Cairo, Qaytbay, were very much an illustra-
tion, a product and a confirmation of those Anatolian frontier conditions.31 In 
many ways, therefore, throughout the fifteenth century the disputed politics of 
local state formation and distant integration persisted in Southern and Eastern 
Anatolia, as they did in the regions of Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan, at least until 
the beginning of Turkmen trans-regional empowerment with Jahan Shah Qara 
Qoyunlu.
29 See also Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade.
30 Yıldız, “Razing Gevele and Fortifying Konya”.
31 Har-El, Struggle for domination in the Middle East.
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Closer to West-Asia’s main centers of political power, especially in non- 
urban contexts the political distances from local leaderships often equally re-
mained substantial. This could be due to geographical circumstances hinder-
ing easy access to a nearby region or to the Turko-Mongol practice of regular 
political fragmentation obstructing stable relationships with local power elites, 
amongst other possible more local variables. In all of these contexts of wider 
social distance, various forms of these particular politics of distant integration 
also persevered in Western Anatolia, in Syria and Egypt, in Azerbaijan and in 
Eastern Iran and Transoxiana, despite the more successful trajectories of state 
formation in operation in and beyond those regions. Arab and Turkmen Bed-
ouin, Anatolian tribal and rural associations, Iranian mountain dwellers and 
many more groups participated actively in local and, occasionally, regional 
politics. Across Islamic West-Asia, and across these different social formations, 
these politically relevant groups and people also included trans-local commu-
nities of scholars, mystics and their followers in largely unprecedented ways, 
with people often rallying around charismatic religious leaders and driven by 
heterodox and occultist ideas and apocalyptic fervor.32 The actions of these 
groups had great political relevance on the local or even regional scale, and 
throughout the fifteenth century they therefore often informed central reports 
that either marked these groups as brigands and outlaws, as loyal state agents, 
or as both. These groups’ political actions often indeed countered or subverted 
state formation trajectories, causing endless conflicts and disputes. Alterna-
tively, such conflicts were equally often instigated by the different expectations 
and opportunities raised by the fiction of any attempts at these groups’ distant 
integration into such trajectories. Besides such efforts, mainly in the form of 
diplomatic exchanges, at mutually beneficial integration into the military and 
administrative apparatus, central powers mostly resorted to costly punitive ex-
peditions as their main mechanism for resolving these recurrent tensions with 
Bedouin and other nomadic and rural interests, or dealing with subversive 
32 Binbaş, Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran. Binbaş actually argues that substantial dia-
chronic change defined the space for political participation for networks of intellectuals, 
scholars and men of religion in the course of the fifteenth century, suggesting on the one 
hand that the state formation processes in the Ottoman Northwest and Timurid East of 
West-Asia in particular integrated such loosely defined networks more effectively from 
the mid-century onwards. On the other hand Binbaş believes that those same processes 
simultaneously empowered more complexly organized networks of Sufi masters and fol-
lowers as active partners and agents and eventually as rivals, with the Safawiyya Sufi 
brotherhood and their Eastern-Anatolian Turkmen supporters transforming into the Sa-
favid imperial polity.
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ideas and claims. Even in the more directly administered environments of the 
Ottoman Northwest, the ‘Turkish’ Southwest, the Turkmen North and the 
Timurid East, most attempts at more structural integration and control still 
quickly proved too resource-intensive to maintain for any states in formation 
during this time. It was only in the Ottoman North that this mutually constitu-
tive wavering between an accommodated and a violent integration of local, 
centrifugal power relationships sometimes acquired a more structured out-
look. This phenomenon was apparent in the practice of moving certain, sub-
versive, Anatolian populations and social groups to new regions, especially 
across the Bosporus. There, as local outsiders, their fortunes were more inti-
mately linked to that of the trajectory of the Ottoman state in their new roles 
as economic and military agents of that state. This Ottoman practice of collec-
tive resettlement (sürgün), achieved through a combination of violent coer-
cion and the award of economic privileges, manifested itself most famously 
between 1468 and 1473 in the repopulation of the new capital of Constantino-
ple with people from the South-Anatolian Karamanid lands. A powerful tool in 
the particular trajectory of Ottoman state formation, however, in the fifteenth 
century it remained simply an ad hoc solution to particular problems of dis-
tant integration just like any other that was available to the Ottoman sultans, 
and to their West-Asian peers.
3.3 The Politics of Central Elite Renewal: mamluks, kul, and Turks
Islamic West-Asia’s multivalent trajectories of Turko-Mongol state formation 
generated multiple new opportunities not only for the empowerment of an-
cient or distant local groups and elites. These trajectories also interacted along 
mutually defining pathways with all kinds of other social formations of more 
recent stock and specialization, similarly complementing or even joining the 
ranks of the Turko-Mongol leaderships of the post-Temür era at the very cores 
of its political centers. The complete integration of political, military and even 
social outsiders as new power elites was nothing new in the histories of Is-
lamic West-Asia. However, as will become clear below, in the fifteenth century 
this happened with a variety, range and to an extent which were quite unprec-
edented, and therefore deserving of separate discussion, if only for the way 
they further illustrate the particular trajectories of Islamic West-Asian state 
formation.
In the final quarter of the fourteenth century, Temür’s enterprise sought to 
use a politics of endless conquest to create a new trans-regional West-Asian 
power elite composed of his family and of his comrades-in-arms, most of whom 
stemmed from minor leaderships in the Chagatai nomadic conglomerate of 
Central Asia. This radical social transformation thus generated the nucleus of 
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the fifteenth century’s Timurid leaderships.33 Temür was continuing long-
standing practices accompanying the establishment of new Turko-Mongol 
leaderships, and his achievement in replacing more traditional, structured 
power relationships with entirely new, personalized ones was, as explained 
before, regularly repeated across West-Asia as part of Turko-Mongol tanistry 
and appanage practices. In Timurid and Turkmen contexts, however, these 
regular shifts never entirely repeated Temür’s exploit of the creation of a radi-
cally new central elite at the turn of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. The 
East’s political centers of Tabriz, Shiraz, Herat and Samarkand continued to be 
dominated by Temür’s military elite of Turko-Mongol powerholders as well as 
their Turkmen peers of more traditional leadership origins. This happened 
above all in an uneasy, mutually restrictive interaction with the particular tra-
jectories of state formation that developed around long-reigning successful 
rulers such as Shah Rukh, Sultan-Abu Saʿid, Jahan Shah, Uzun Hasan, and 
Sultan- Husayn. Regularly partaking in the expanding political and military ap-
paratuses around these rulers and their courts, these military elites were col-
lectively identified as one exclusive political community of ‘Turks’, even though 
their ranks remained divided by violent competition and internecine warfare, 
and by political action undermining and disrupting as much as supporting 
those trajectories of state formation. There were regular endeavors to intro-
duce fuller integration or even the marginalization of these centrifugal ‘Turk-
ish’ military elites but these attempts at strengthening particular central state 
formation trajectories were never entirely successful in disciplining the era’s 
Turko-Mongol tide of devolved authority and recurrent fragmentation. As a 
result, from Temür’s time onwards, Timurid, Turkmen and Turko-Mongol mili-
tary leaders, families and lineages continued to hold on to their access to au-
thority, power and income across these regions, pursuing interests that never 
easily aligned with those of their sovereigns, and continuously negotiating bal-
ances of power that everywhere checked the political autonomy of these ‘Turk-
ish’ amirs as well as of Timurid and Turkmen rulers and princes.
In the contexts of the Ottoman and ‘Turkish’ Sultanates, on the contrary, 
feats similar to Temür’s creation of a new elite appeared in more systematic 
ways than ever before, and can arguably even be seen as important functions 
of these Sultanates’ particular trajectories of state formation. The historical 
trajectory that, in modern scholarship, tends to be most intimately connected 
with this notion of a socio-political reproduction through the repeated re- 
creation of Turko-Mongol elites is that of the Sultanate of Cairo in Egypt and 
Syria, today also known for this reason as the Mamluk Sultanate. For centuries 
the personal armies and warbands of rulers and leaders in Egypt and Syria had 
33 Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane.
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been constructed around the skills and capacities of hardened horsemen. 
Most of these horsemen were brought to the region in unfree (mamluk) condi-
tions via commercially vibrant commodity chains especially from Inner Asia’s 
steppes and the Caucasus, to be subsequently prepared for military and politi-
cal service in their new master’s entourage. Throughout this long period, but 
especially since the mid-thirteenth century, many individuals originating as 
mamluks managed to acquire local or regional power and leadership, building 
up their own armies of mamluks, and occasionally even attaining the sultan-
ate. As mentioned before, in the post-Temür fifteenth century amirs and sul-
tans with diverse mamluk origins emerged more consistently than ever before 
as actors and agents of the Sultanate’s state. Collectively identified in contem-
porary communication as both Circassians (Jarakisa) and Turks (Atrak) at the 
same time, almost all of these sultans and amirs had been among the tens of 
thousands of mamluks who, throughout the century, were sold in Egypt, re-
educated as Sunni Muslims, trained as Turko-Mongol horsemen, accustomed 
to speaking Qipchaq Turkic, and accommodated to Turkic patterns of martial 
behavior. New groups of these Turkified Circassians regularly rejuvenated the 
ranks of a sultan’s personal troops in particular, to strengthen his military ca-
pacities, to counterbalance those of his mamluk military commanders, the 
amirs, and to expand the pool of military experts available for him to rely on 
and to favor in return with rank, status and income. The Sultanate’s political 
elites of ‘Turkish’ amirs therefore all shared similar individual histories of 
mostly (non-Turkish and non-Muslim) Caucasian origins, juvenile enslave-
ment and transfer, long years of royal military and court service and of resource 
building, and endless competition for status and income with regular batches 
of new royal favorites of similar backgrounds. In fact, in this process of highly 
competitive social reproduction amidst the expansion of the sultan’s bureau-
cratic apparatus and the lengthening of its chains of authority and command, 
not just particular sets of mamluk amirs-courtiers, but also groups of the sul-
tan’s mamluk rank-and-file in Cairo appear to have acquired more political au-
tonomy than ever before. In any case, the unruly behavior in Cairo’s urban 
spaces of the more recent royal imports (julban) among them is a well-known, 
even notorious, problem of the Sultanate’s fifteenth-century history. Through 
a combination of coercive action and anticipation of immediate material re-
wards, they were often a deciding factor in successions to the sultanate as 
well as the extent to which the reigns of sultans in this century were marked 
by the presence or absence of central stability and prosperity.34 In general, 
however, all of these developments aligned the identities, interests and con-
flicts of sultans, amirs and their personal entourages of family, followers and 
34 Levanoni, “Rank-and-File Mamluks versus amirs”.
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mamluks, in intimately centripetal ways with the political order that had given 
them their new lives of power, precedence and opportunity.
Unlike in previous centuries in Syro-Egypt, and unlike elsewhere in Islamic 
West-Asia, that political order of the fifteenth-century Sultanate of Cairo ac-
quired a highly meritocratic, socially transcendent and increasingly ideational 
flavor. The reason for this is that, amidst the realities of Turko-Mongol tanistric 
politics, recurring attempts to again make it a dynastic order like in preceding 
centuries never succeeded. This is also illustrated in the short-lived case of 
 al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1496–98), son and successor of al-Ashraf Qaytbay 
(r. 1468–96), presented in Albrecht Fuess’ discussion of this sultan’s dynastic 
endeavors in Chapter 4 of this volume. In contrast, the expanding bureaucratic 
apparatus, the military and political experts who manned this apparatus, and 
the flows of human and financial resources that supported them, endured, 
even if only in tense and conflict-ridden ways. A remarkable factor that illus-
trates this non-dynastic trajectory of Syro-Egyptian state formation through 
the fifteenth century concerns the transformation of the position of sultan 
 itself into a bureaucratic prize to be won, and lost, by the highest bidder. 
Such a qualification needs to be weighed against the achievements, longevi-
ty  and  subsequent empowering royalty of sultans such as al-Ashraf Barsbay 
(r.   1422–38), al-Zahir Jaqmaq (r. 1438–53), al-Ashraf Qaytbay (r. 1468–96) and 
Qanṣawh (r. 1501–16). However, as mentioned before, in most cases, including 
those of the latter four sultans, the embattled accessions to the sultanate tend-
ed to crown long careers of military and court service and of resource accumu-
lation in the royal shadows of peers. Apparently, it took a long time to acquire 
the main political and financial competences necessary for gathering (and 
keeping) the support of royal mamluks and amirs-courtiers. Many sultans in 
the fifteenth century had enjoyed long default careers in the state apparatus 
meaning that most of them only managed to accede to the sultanate at a fairly 
advanced age. Whereas Barsbay, in 1422, had been in his forties, his successor 
Jaqmaq was in his sixties when he succeeded to the throne in 1438. Al-Ashraf 
Inal (r. 1453–61), like his two predecessors, was originally a talented horseman 
and Circassian mamluk brought to Egypt from the Caucasus in the 1390s. When 
he succeeded Jaqmaq, he was 73 and for him, this succession brought to a 
 glorious close his long and eventful career of leadership as a military com-
mander, as a governor in various Syrian towns and cities, and as an entrepreneur- 
courtier in Cairo. Similar stories of humble origins, service and empowerment 
have survived about most of Inal’s successors, belonging to new, younger gen-
erations of mamluk state actors. Al-Zahir Khushqadam (r. 1461–7) and Qaytbay 
were in their fifties when they became sultan, and just like the unsuccessful 
septuagenarian al-Zahir Yalbay (r. 1467) and his equally unfortunate successor 
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al-Zahir Timurbugha (r. 1467–68) they all had been brought to Egypt and Turki-
fied in the 1420s and 1430s before embarking upon long and conflict-ridden 
careers of military, administrative and court leadership. Finally, in the 1490s a 
third generation of veteran military bureaucrats graduated into competent 
candidates for sultanic office, all originating as new mamluks in Egypt in the 
1450s and 1460s, and including Qansawh, who was in his sixties when he as-
cended the throne in 1501 and who infamously died of a stroke in 1516 on a 
battlefield in Northern Syria, appalled by the victorious onslaught of the Otto-
man sultan Selim.35
The absence of dynastic reproduction, and the regular competitive but co-
herent self-renewal of the Turko-Circassian political community more gener-
ally, seem unique for the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate’s trajectory of state formation in 
fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous Otto-
man Sultanate, which was obviously entirely constructed around the success-
ful reproduction of the Ottoman dynasty, also experimented intensely with 
centripetal strategies of elite renewal that had a lot in common with those of 
the Southern Sultanate’s. Here too, complete outsiders were transformed into 
central state actors through a system of total re-socialization and centralizing 
entanglement. In fact, upon closer inspection even the Ottoman dynasty itself 
was a product, and a telling illustration, of this gradual construction of a new, 
specifically Ottoman, political community. The sultans Murad (r. 1421–44, 
1446–51), Mehmed (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) and Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) were all born 
from unfree women, selected and brought to the Ottoman court as royal con-
cubines for the sole purpose of the royal lineage’s successful reproduction. 
Only sultan Selim (r. 1512–20) was an exception to this rule, as the product of a 
marriage between Bayezid and the daughter of the Dulkadirid ruler of Elbistan 
in Southeast Anatolia. The latter, however, only represented an acute late- 
fifteenth-century moment in the Sultanate’s politics of distant integration, 
whereas the former cases were all part of a complementary, expanding prac-
tice of internal renewal and total integration. This was gradually generating a 
novel elite, even within the Ottoman royal household, gathering various sets of 
state actors whose competences and fortunes were intimately connected with 
the maintenance of the Ottoman dynastic order, and with the expansion of the 
apparatus that performed this order.
As Dimitri Kastritsis explains in great detail in Chapter 5, when he writes 
about the doomed fate of the Çandarlı family of traditional Ottoman bureau-
crats, this integrative reproduction of the Sultanate’s political community 
35 Levanoni, “The Sultan’s Laqab”, esp. p. 82.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:27:03PM
via free access
Van Steenbergen68
<UN>
through substantial renewal was anything but a straightforward and uncon-
tested process. Like in the case of the Sultanate of Cairo the performance of 
this elite reproduction through the military and political prioritization of un-
free dynastic agents (kapikulari) of varying expertise, gender and outsider ori-
gins was rooted in longstanding local and regional customs. Basically, the Otto-
man solution to the perennial problem of the continuous need for loyal 
manpower appeared above all in the format of the so-called ‘new army’ 
(yeniçeri), a personal bodyguard entirely made up of trained footmen selected 
from the ranks of the sultan’s unfree servants (kul). The precise historical tra-
jectory of this Janissary corps, of similar central regiments of loyal and sea-
soned fighters, and of the kapikulari more in general, are forever lost in the 
mists of hindsight narratives explaining the origins and nature of Ottoman suc-
cess.36 Whereas these phenomena had emerged and settled in already before 
the Sultanate’s near destruction in the wake of Temür’s victory in 1402, they 
only really started appearing as a dominant practice of Ottoman elite renewal 
in the mid-century reign of Mehmed ii. At that time, they became more than 
ever a function of, and a contributing factor to, the Ottoman trajectory of state 
formation and of the expansion, specialization and symbiotic empowerment 
of the dynasty and its agents alike.
By the mid-fifteenth century at the latest, the Janissary corps of unfree foot-
men and similar central military regiments, all directly rewarded for their ser-
vice by their master, the sultan, were not just providing regularly renewed Ot-
toman manpower. As kul whose destiny was directly dependent upon that of 
their master’s, the sultan, they also balanced the power and interests of the 
Sultanate’s traditional elites in important, centripetal ways. These included a 
wide range of military commanders, mostly belonging to ancient Turkish and 
Anatolian families of cavalrymen (sipahi) and spread all across the core Otto-
man territories, as timar-holders with their own troops of horsemen, along 
separate hierarchies of power, status and resources. The substantial expansion 
of the Janissary corps under Mehmed, who managed to double its size to about 
10,000 members by the 1470s, thus both represented and enabled a decisive shift 
in this traditional balance of military power to the sultan’s benefit. As part of 
the Ottoman trajectory of state formation, however, this expansion also went 
hand in hand with the growth of the Janissaries’ own political autonomy at the 
center of the Ottoman political order. With its ranks continuously being replen-
ished from the kul and with its size steadily maintained at mid-century level, 
the Janissary corps acquired a reputation not just for causing havoc and turmoil 
at moments of political instability, but also for thus becoming a powerful actor 
36 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 112–113.
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at such moments, and one whose actions and choices left many marks on the 
Ottoman political order, without ever challenging that order. In the context of 
the tanistric succession struggles of the 1440s, the 1480s, and above all the 
1500s, Janissary violence and anticipation of rewards proved a factor to be reck-
oned with, and their actions eventually even decided the accession of Selim 
(r. 1512–20) to the top of the Sultanate’s political order.37
The kul’s transformative role in the expansion and empowerment of the Ot-
toman state apparatus in the fifteenth century also played out at other, more 
individual, levels of elite participation and reproduction. In fact, the gradual 
diversification and specialization of the bureaucratic apparatus were also rep-
licated within the burgeoning ranks of the sultan’s unfree servants. Many of 
these kul came to be selected and trained for non-military duties, entering the 
service of the sultan’s household and its expanding administration. In due 
course, particularly starting from the mid-century reign of Mehmed, several of 
these courtier-bureaucrats with kul origins even succeeded in becoming mem-
bers of the sultan’s leading advisory council, the imperial divan, or in obtaining 
the post of grand vizier, chairing the divan and acting as the most powerful 
Ottoman bureaucrat after the sultan. This remarkable wider employment and 
empowerment of individual kul at the sultan’s court again provided for impor-
tant centripetal checks and balances on the power and expertise of traditional 
Ottoman elites. This peculiar aspect of Ottoman bureaucratic growth and state 
formation gradually, often violently, and mostly haphazardly pushed these an-
cient Turkish and Anatolian families (including that of the Çandarlı) away 
from the center of Ottoman power. The Ottoman trajectory of state formation 
therefore eventually manifested itself in, and was indeed pursued by, the emer-
gence of a very different, very Ottoman, political leadership. Consisting in in-
creasingly exclusive ways of royal unfree or freed servants, this new political 
elite came to be dominated by regularly rejuvenated sets of military, adminis-
trative and court experts. These people were specifically selected and trained 
for the single purpose of service to a more and more abstract idea of Ottoman 
political order, and rose in the ranks of the expanding apparatus to positions of 
Ottoman authority and power through a combination of bureaucratic compe-
tence, royal favor and the elimination of competitors.
The expanding membership of the kapikulari thus gradually moved their 
field of action from serving in the sultan’s personal entourage to having a sig-
nificant impact within, and upon, the military, administrative and political ap-
paratus of the Ottoman political order. This new Ottoman leadership of kul 
bureaucrats saw its ranks regularly replenished from particular sources of 
37 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, p. 258.
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manpower that continued to ensure that all kul began their military or admin-
istrative careers more or less as newcomers to that political order. Many of the 
unfree who were selected to enter the sultan’s palace for further specialist 
training and education did so as prisoners of war, captured during the endless 
military campaigns, especially against non-Muslim adversaries. Some also 
continued to enter via the commodity chains and specialist markets that con-
nected the many corners of Islamic West-Asia in general with the wider world 
and that provided most of the power elites between Constantinople, Cairo and 
Samarkand with high-quality household and other staff. War and commerce 
were, however, expensive, resource-intensive and hazardous enterprises, and 
were not an easy way to provide for a steady supply of manpower to meet any 
growing demands. Unlike the ‘Turkish’ Sultanate in the Southwest the Otto-
man leaderships managed to overcome this predicament and to complement 
the common but rather vulnerable dependence on production centers and 
commodity chains beyond a political center’s direct reach and control. They 
turned to new, more internal, resources for elite renewal, and thus established 
more structured flows of manpower. In fact, in the Ottoman context this hap-
pened by tweaking—first on ad hoc bases but increasingly also along more 
regulated lines—particular tax farming and tributary arrangements with non-
Muslim communities in a practical direction that could meet the continuous 
Ottoman need for manpower. These more specific arrangements became 
known as the Ottoman practice of ‘collection’ (devşirme). They entailed that 
from every forty households in Christian communities in regions such as Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, Serbia or Anatolia, one boy aged between 8 and 18 years was to be 
hand-picked as part of the payment of the Ottoman levy imposed on these 
communities and sent to the sultan’s agents in Bursa, Edirne or Constantino-
ple for allocation to the Janissary corps. If the boy was endowed with excep-
tional qualities he was sent to the palace and given several years’ training for 
military or palace service, until he would be recruited to fill a vacancy in the 
corps or at the palace and start a career of bureaucratic service and, poten-
tially, leadership in the expanding military, administrative or political appara-
tus of the Ottoman political order.
Whatever the violent, commercial or tributary arrangements that trans-
formed these kul into unfree servants of the Ottoman sultan, they all obviously 
were entering the Ottoman household and, increasingly even becoming mem-
bers of the Ottoman political community from backgrounds which were ex-
tremely diverse ethnically, socio-economically and culturally. Just like the 
Turkified mamluks in the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate, the aim of the preparation 
of these newcomers for Ottoman service was first and foremost to transform 
them into a more uniform community of loyal Muslim subjects of their master, 
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the sultan. Albanians, Greeks and many others who were thus integrated into 
the center of power were all forced to convert to Islam. They had to learn to 
communicate in the Ottoman variant of the Turkic language, to conform to 
Ottoman Turkish values and rules of behavior, and to nurture social bonds 
with peers and with other Ottoman agents. In general, the idea was to make 
them ‘Turkified’ and allow them to become full partners and stakeholders in 
the dynasty’s own, regularly replenished, elite social formation of the new ‘Ot-
tomans’ (Osmanli). Metin Kunt summarizes as follows the early modern out-
come of this process of the genesis of an entirely new Turko-Ottoman political 
community and identity:
By the mid-sixteenth century the Ottoman military-administrative elite 
was made up of these new Turkish-speaking Muslim officers who called 
themselves not Turkish but ‘Roman’ or ‘Ottoman’; it was in this sense that 
Ottoman writers could comment that the ‘Ottomans’ took the best quali-
ties of many nations and blended them to a new, superior race […]. The 
Ottoman dynasty, too, was as much a product of this new blend as their 
servitors. From the beginnings of the family of Osman, the beys made 
marriage alliances with neighbouring Byzantine or Serbian princesses. 
Later the sultans chose not to continue such marriages but sired their 
sons and daughters with harem favourites of various ethnic backgrounds 
brought up in the palace. The language of the dynasty as well as of the 
polity remained Turkish, but not, strictly speaking, as a mother tongue.38
Half a century earlier, at the turn of the fifteenth century, the boundaries of the 
Ottoman political community were not yet so exclusively delineated by the 
kapikulari and their distinctive Turko-Ottoman identity. Nevertheless, as ex-
plained above, they certainly formed an increasingly formidable factor among 
the Sultanate’s central power elites, as they and their expertise, action and re-
lationships infiltrated, monopolized and reproduced the expanding tentacles 
of the Ottoman political order in (and beyond) the Northwestern corner of 
West-Asia. In this capacity they displayed many obvious parallels and connec-
tions with the contemporaneous hegemony of the Turko-Circassian commu-
nity of mamluk bureaucrat-leaders in the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate. Even the 
social reproduction of these fifteenth-century mamluk bureaucrat-leaders and 
of their kul peers and contemporaries was largely bound by similar practices 
and conventions. The increasingly distinctive kapikulari status at this time re-
mained the exclusive domain of kul of non-Muslim origins who owed their 
38 Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids”, pp. 197–199 (quote p. 199).
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new lives, identities and careers entirely to their master, the sultan. For this 
reason, until at least the 1510s the many members of the Janissary corps were 
even prohibited from marrying and producing offspring. As the chains of au-
thority and command were lengthening in the course of the Sultanate’s pro-
cess of state formation, selection for, access to, and management of the kapiku-
lari was also increasingly administered and controlled by kul bureaucrats 
rather than by the sultan himself or any other courtier of more traditional 
stock. There was thus a growing, self-fulfilling bias at the Ottoman center in 
relation to the expanding ranks, expertise and relationships of the kul, even 
regarding the management of their own renewal. This meant that bureaucratic 
power amassed by an Ottoman military or court leader was increasingly only 
transmitted on the basis of bureaucratic competence, favor and patronage, 
and success in the endless competition with peers and others, and not on the 
basis of kinship or lineage.
Several of the long careers in Turkifying palace service, bureaucratic special-
ization and, eventually, Ottoman leadership and authority during the long 
reigns of sultans Mehmed and Bayezid represent a strong illustration of, and 
defining factor in, the Ottoman trajectory of state formation and of the mutual 
empowerment of the kapikulari and of their master, the sultan. These careers 
also demonstrate how the politics whereby the central elite was reproduced by 
substantial renewal from within the Sultanate’s territorial boundaries enabled 
different kinds of remarkable continuity that intersected in successful ways 
with the politics of Ottoman integration. Out of the fifteen different individu-
als who occupied the court’s leading position of grand vizier between the 1450s 
and the 1510s only three belonged to traditional Turkish families. All the other 
grand viziers in this period had Christian backgrounds, just like many other 
viziers, lower officials and commanders. They entered the Ottoman political 
order and embarked upon new, Ottoman, careers of authority and power as 
hand-picked devşirme levies mostly collected from rural communities in the 
Balkans or as prisoners-of-war captured in the ongoing confrontations with 
(former) Byzantine and Balkan elites. These various coercive arrangements 
thus simultaneously allowed some of the experts, expertise and relationships 
of power of its former Christian adversaries to be directly integrated into the 
center of Ottoman power. This was one distinctive outcome of the unique situ-
ation of the Ottoman Sultanate’s substantial expansion into the Christian Bal-
kans, and this remarkable phenomenon again empowered both the Sultan, 
providing him with a particular group of new loyal servants, and these new kul, 
including many of former Byzanto-Balkan noble stock who were now convert-
ed to Islam and Turkified. At the turn of the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries 
many of the latter became leading members of the increasingly powerful 
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Turko-Ottoman political community and of the political order to which that 
community owed its very existence.39 Very symbolically, and tellingly, they 
even had in their ranks at least two nephews of the last Byzantine emperor. 
Captured as young boys during the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 
1453, they were only known by their Muslim names and Turko-Ottoman titles 
as Mesih Pasha (d. 1501) and Has Murad Pasha (d. 1473). These boys eventually 
came to hold major positions of military and palace leadership, including the 
governorship of the Balkans (beylerbey of Rumeli) and the grand vizierate dur-
ing the reigns of sultans Mehmed and Bayezid. They both seem to have done so 
without ever losing at least some appreciation for their imperial Byzantine ori-
gins.40 Inspired by these and many similar cases from the latter half of the fif-
teenth century Karen Barkey, paraphrasing Heath Lowry, concludes with good 
reason that “after 1453, the Ottoman palace was packed with ‘Byzantine and 
Balkan aristocrats turned Vezirs’”.41
3.4 The Politics of Central Elite Reproduction: Scholars, Scribes and 
Tajiks
This remarkable transformation-cum-integration of the Ottoman Sultanate’s 
political community through an ever more internalized and automated pro-
cess of renewal was quite unique for fifteenth-century West-Asia. This singu-
larity manifested itself especially in this process’ successful marginalization of 
traditional Turkish and Anatolian elites and their more centrifugal interests, 
and also in the way it converged various local experts, expertise and relation-
ships of power in the sultan’s expanding household, palace and political order. 
Elsewhere, reproduction of power and status among central elites happened in 
more diverse and multivalent ways, which require a separate discussion.
In the Sultanate of Cairo, the regular renewal of military-bureaucratic elites 
certainly paralleled that of the ‘Ottomans’ as a self-sustaining and centripetal 
practice. In the Sultanate’s case this determined the marginalization of dynas-
tic trends even more, including in relation to access to the very top of its politi-
cal order. At the same time, however, the Sultanate followed an entirely differ-
ent path from that of the remarkable convergence of the Ottoman state 
formation trajectory in the kapikulari. In the latter Ottoman case the tradition-
al bureaucratic distinctions between ‘the men of the swords’, ‘the men of the 
39 Lowry, The Early Ottoman state, pp. 115–130 (“Chapter Seven: The Last Phase of Ottoman 
Syncretism—the subsumption of members of the Byzanto-Balkan aristocracy into the 
Ottoman ruling elite”).
40 Lowry, “A Note on three Palaiologon princes as members of the Ottoman ruling elite”.
41 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 80; Lowry, The early Ottoman State, p. 118.
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pen’ and ‘the men of the turbans’ certainly continued to inform the organiza-
tion of the expanding state apparatus. However, the boundaries of the first two 
categories appeared as increasingly fluid in terms of people and relationships 
of power, especially in the wake of the expanding involvement and diversifica-
tion of the Ottoman sultan’s kul. In the Sultanate of Cairo, however, a more 
complex politics of central elite reproduction appears to have existed. This 
complemented, in equally centripetal ways, the construction of a Turko- 
Circassian political community. Unlike in the Ottoman case, in Cairo and else-
where in the Sultanate those traditional boundaries of specialization and re-
production were constructed along alternative lines of functional and social 
distinction. There, mamluks generally—but not exclusively—held titles, posi-
tions, privileges and responsibilities of the first, military category while a mix 
of experts particularly with local Syro-Egyptian origins continued to manipu-
late the mechanisms of central taxation, remuneration, communication and 
justice that are traditionally ascribed to the second and third categories.
In fact, in fifteenth-century Cairo several of the latter experts became ex-
tremely wealthy bureaucratic leaders in their own right, controlling the court’s 
flows of resources, its symbolic apparatus and related sets of court relation-
ships in highly empowering ways. Most of these non-military competitors for 
power at the top of the Sultanate’s political order actually came from a mere 
handful of families of administrators and scholars of (formerly) Christian or 
Muslim, and Syrian or Egyptian origins. After many years of engagement in lo-
cal low-profile scholarship and scribal service, different members of these 
families had only entered Cairo’s court and its expanding bureaucratic appara-
tus in the 1410s and 1420s, as a function of their employment in the pre- sultanic, 
amiral households of the sultans al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 1412–21) and al-Ashraf 
Barsbay (r. 1422–38). Men (and women) from the most successful of these new 
bureaucratic elite families, such as the Banu al-Barizi from Ḥama, the Banu 
Muzhir from Damascus, and the Egyptian Coptic converts of the Banu Katib 
Jakam, continued to appear at court until the end of the Sultanate a century 
later. There, they would partake in the performance of its administrative, reli-
gious and sometimes even military apparatus, currying royal favor, gathering 
enormous wealth, and pursuing all kinds of relationships of power and exper-
tise, including through royal, amiral and other highly political marriages. Dy-
nastic tendencies therefore certainly determined the transmission of office 
and power within many of these families. Examples here include the Banu 
Katib Jakam, whose members held the top post of the supervision of the royal 
fisc (nazr al-khass) continuously between 1425 and 1458 and that of the army 
bureau (nazr al-jaysh) between 1466 and 1496, or the formerly Coptic Banu 
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l-Jiʿan family, whose members were associated with the supervision of the trea-
sury (nazr al-khizana) for about a century until 1501.42
Nevertheless, despite this apparent trend towards dynastic reproduction, a 
more centralizing practice of competitive renewal simultaneously imposed it-
self. This practice was defined by factors of competence, favor, resources and 
their opposites, rather than simply by any rights or privileges of kinship or lin-
eage. Such qualities and competences were obviously rooted in particular, ad-
ministrative skills and successes, which created opportunities and opened 
many doors, and which were certainly easier to possess or acquire for these 
and many similar families’ offspring than for any outsider. At the same time, 
however, just as with the Turko-Circassian community of royal mamluks and 
amirs, the acquisition of authority and leadership in the expanding state ap-
paratus was a different matter from bureaucratic service. That acquisition in-
stead had more to do with more generic qualities of entrepreneurship, charis-
ma, distinction, brokerage and wealth. The ongoing growth of the Sultanate’s 
apparatus therefore continuously created new opportunities for ambitious in- 
and outsiders, as well as providing all kinds of new arenas of fierce competi-
tion along the Sultanate’s lengthening chains of authority and agency. As a 
 result, at the pinnacle of the Sultanate’s fifteenth century political order, some-
times not just families, but also individuals of lesser and diverse professional 
and social origins—such as the infamous Abu l-Khayr al-Naḥḥas (‘the Copper-
smith’) (1412–59)—occasionally emerged as new bureaucratic leaders. When 
this happened, it was often much to the dismay and horror of their competi-
tors of more traditional stock, and with important mitigating effects on the 
reproduction of power for any more consolidated group of administrators at 
court.43
Even among scholars and scribes, therefore, hierarchies of central leader-
ship were not easily reproduced, but rather continuously challenged and re-
newed in often conflict-ridden ways. Participation and advancement in these 
hierarchies depended on bureaucratic skills and precedents, but it was even 
more contingent on an individual’s political and financial competences which 
they required for gathering (and keeping) the support of subordinates, peers 
and sovereigns. As a result, like the careers of sultans and amirs, those of some 
of the most prominent non-military leaders and courtiers of the Sultanate’s 
42 Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration dans l’état militaire mamlūk (ixe/xve 
siècle).
43 Mortel, “The Decline of Mamlūk Civil Bureaucracy in the Fifteenth Century”; Elbendary, 
Crowds and Sultans.
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fifteenth century history were also marked by many years of service and of 
 accumulating political and financial resources—relationships, wealth and 
power. We might think of figures such as Jamal al-Din Yusuf b. Katib Jakam 
(1416–58), supervisor of the royal fisc (nazir al-khass) for five successive sultans 
(1437–58), Yahya al-Ashqar (d. 1469), major-domo (ustadar) for most of the 
period between 1440 and 1467, and Abu Bakr b. Muzhir (1428–88), the court’s 
confidential secretary (katib al-sirr) at the head of the royal chancery from 1463 
until his death in 1488. At the same time, however, in the absence of any real 
dynastic practices, the political opportunities and autonomy thus acquired by 
these and many more central bureaucrat-scholars and -scribes in the fifteenth-
century Syro-Egyptian Sultanate remained highly conditional and volatile. 
Above all, they remained intimately connected to the bureaucratic roles that 
they managed to play, to the political and financial resources that those roles 
enabled them to tap into, and even to the conflicts over those roles and re-
sources in which they continuously had to engage. Their career paths of ser-
vice and leadership therefore continued to be tied up in centripetal ways with 
the maintenance and reproduction of the political order to which they mostly 
owed those careers. This was true even when on an individual or collective 
basis they were bound to prioritize their own rather than that order’s empow-
erment.44 The powerful leadership of many of these local bureaucrats, and the 
regular competitive renewal of their ranks, therefore remained an illustration, 
and function, of the Sultanate’s particular, mutually empowering, trajectory of 
state formation, just like that was also true for its Turko-Circassian political 
community of amirs and sultans.
As mentioned above, unlike their Turko-Circassian and Turko-Ottoman 
counterparts the Timurid and Turkmen politico-military communities in the 
North and East remained much more fragmented and determined by the tanis-
tric political and economic interests of ‘Turkish’ military leaders, families and 
lineages. These mostly owed their continued regional empowerment to Te-
mür’s construction of a new elite at the turn of the fourteenth century, and to 
its largely successful dynastic reproduction throughout the fifteenth century. 
At the same time, however, the highly contested trajectories of state formation 
that marked the reigns of Shah Rukh, Abu Saʿid, Jahan Shah, Uzun Hasan and 
Sultan Husayn did not just continue to have to engage in mutually restrictive 
ways with these ‘Turkish’ elites and the reproduction of their mainly centrifu-
gal interests. These trajectories certainly also interacted closely with the repro-
duction of particular Persian scribal and scholarly elites and their practices 
and skills, both benefiting from this reproductive process and stimulating it in 
44 Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamluk Period”.
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centripetal and political ways that remind one of the experiences of their peers 
in the Sultanate of Cairo. These elites were collectively identified as ‘Tajiks’ and 
employed as expert administrators managing the assets and interests of both 
‘Turkish’ amirs and Timurid-Turkmen rulers across the region. Throughout the 
fifteenth century several individual members of these elites emerged from ad-
ministrative service in these rulers’ households and palaces to bureaucratic 
leadership in their political orders. They were deeply involved, in mutually em-
powering ways, in the expansion, maintenance and reproduction of those or-
ders, refining and controlling most of their mechanisms of central taxation, 
remuneration, communication and justice. In the process, these administra-
tors accumulated substantial political and financial resources alongside rela-
tionships, wealth and power, from which their own families, friends and fol-
lowers equally benefited.
As Beatrice Manz also explains in detail in her chapter on the political in-
volvement of Iranian landed elites in Part 3 of this volume, quite a few such ‘Ta-
jik’ leaders of Perso-Iranian origins thus became formidable political leaders in 
their own right, occasionally even engaging in military leadership and warfare 
with their own, personal troops. In these ways they managed to counter in sig-
nificant and effective centripetal ways ‘Turkish’ competitors for central power 
and ‘Turkish’ challengers of that power and its political order. Among the most 
remarkable and powerful of these non-military leaders at the Timurid and 
Turkmen courts were undoubtedly Ghiyath al-Din Pir-Ahmad Khwafi (d. 1453), 
head of Shah Rukh’s finance office between 1417 and 1447 who later served at the 
courts of various other Timurid princes, and his son Majd al-Din Muhammad 
Khwafi, chief accountant at Sultan-Husayn’s court since its first installation in 
Herat in 1469, who was chief agent of the court’s centralizing trajectory of bu-
reaucratic expansion and specialization. Eventually, in 1494, after many years of 
competition and confrontations with the court’s ‘Turkish’ memberships, Majd 
al-Din Muhammad was tortured, deprived of his allegedly fabulous wealth, 
and murdered.45 These two careers, spanning almost a century of Timurid rul-
ership in West-Asia’s East, represent a remarkable, personalized connection be-
tween these two distinct moments of Timurid state formation during the first 
half and final quarter of the fifteenth century respectively. In fact, connections 
such as these are anything but exceptional for political careers in the Timurid 
and Turkmen North and East, where the imperfect integration of ‘Turkish’ com-
manders and the balancing empowerment of ‘Tajik’ administrative experts rep-
resented practical realities that connected individuals, groups and institutions 
across all kinds of regularly shifting boundaries of loyalty,  service and political 
45 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 79–99.
Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:27:03PM
via free access
Van Steenbergen78
<UN>
order.46 The careers of Pir-Ahmad and his son Muhammad at various Timurid 
courts are therefore a powerful illustration of how in Islamic West-Asia’s North 
and East state formation also appeared as one, regularly reproduced, process 
of political transformation, albeit along its own, distinctive trajectory of sym-
biosis and confrontation between fifteenth- century ‘Turkish’ and ‘Tajik’ politi-
cal communities, and of the latter’s reproduction and empowerment across 
Timurid and Turkmen (and occasionally also Ottoman) leaderships.
4 Epilogue: The Trajectories of Fifteenth-Century Boundaries and 
Ideals
It is well known that of these many distinct trajectories of Turko-Mongol state 
formation in Islamic West-Asia, the Ottoman was the only one that continued 
more or less unaltered, indeed in increasingly coherent ways, into the sixteenth 
century. Key factors in this process undoubtedly included military and admin-
istrative expansion, personal and institutional longevity, internalized elite 
 renewal and the reproduction of the Ottoman Sultanate as an increasingly 
 autonomous, integrative and empowering bureaucratic order. But another de-
fining factor was certainly also the strength and tenacity of the era’s other tra-
jectories of state formation in the Southwest, North and East of West-Asia. For 
the Cairo Sultanate this manifested itself from the late 1510s onwards in the 
rapid local integration of Syro-Egyptian elites and practices into this Ottoman 
process, in the continuation of much of the Sultanate’s political apparatus, 
now adapted to Ottoman political realities, and in the substantial recalibration 
of the latter realities to equally accommodate the definitive shift of the Otto-
man political order towards the very center of the Muslim and Eurasian worlds. 
The latter shift, however, was a function not just of Ottoman expansion and ap-
propriation of the Cairo Sultanate’s apparatus and elites, but also of the particu-
lar continuation of the more ambiguous Timurid-Turkmen state formation 
route in Islamic West-Asia’s East, in Uzbek Transoxiana and Mughal Northern 
India as well as in Safavid Iran. Making its appearance on the West-Asian stage 
at the turn of the new century, Shah Ismaʿil’s (r. 1501–24) Safavid authority was 
personally, practically and institutionally in many ways one of the main heirs to 
this Timurid-Turkmen trajectory. At the same time, when that authority ac-
quired a more coherent appearance in the course of the sixteenth century, this 
contributed to the emergence of new East-West frontiers that were also strongly 
46 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 106–110.
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tied to the formation of the political, social and cultural order of the Safavids’ 
early modern Ottoman counterpart.
That early modern Ottoman social order was actually described by Malcolm 
Yapp as “compartmentalized”, and as
a block of flats in which the inhabitants only met in the corridors […] 
[and in which] each compartment had its hierarchy and the leaders of 
those hierarchies transacted much business together […] [I]t was the 
people who bridged the compartments, qāḍīs and notables, who made 
the system work.47
This view certainly reminds one of above-mentioned statements about the 
segmented nature of Turko-Mongol politics and socio-economic organization 
in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. However, although the block of flats, 
with clearly defined compartments, corridors and inhabitants with clearly de-
fined roles is attractive, it is not the most apt metaphor here, given the ongoing 
dynamics of expansion, fragmentation and circulation, recurrent attempts at 
political stabilization and administrative penetration, and, more generally, dif-
ferent trajectories of Turko-Mongol state formation. Even in the Ottoman 
North-West those dynamics, attempts and trajectories remained insufficiently 
fixed, structured or coherent to justify thinking of them in terms of clearly de-
fined and delineated blocks, flats, compartments, corridors and roles. Never-
theless, some social phenomena in the foregoing survey may certainly be un-
derstood as multivalent compartments, autonomous corridor trafficking and 
multiple roles and hierarchies, even if they did appear only in very temporary, 
localized, premature or ad hoc formats, and in conditions of continuous nego-
tiation, accommodation, contestation and experimentation. The metaphor 
therefore may still have some value, as it makes clear how old and new com-
partments continued to take shape and interact amidst the fluidity, volatility 
and incongruence of fifteenth-century West-Asian social order At this time the 
skeleton of certain blocks of flats even became visible, although their construc-
tion remained very much creative work in progress, and although the more 
coherent early modern appearances of some of that work were all but prede-
termined. Above all, this imperfect yet insightful metaphor certainly helps one 
to remain aware of the impact of Turko-Mongol trajectories of state formation 
on these constructions of social order, not least also reminding us of the limits 
of that impact. Driven by coercive power and integrative ambitions these 
trajectories generated a productive centrality for rulers, elites and political 
47 Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, pp. 9–10.
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communities in those skeletons. At the same time, these trajectories emerged 
almost incidentally, and with differing rates of success, from multivalent ac-
tions that were above all about creating new compartments, about expanding, 
reorganizing and repositioning them, and about pursuing priority in the con-
stantly changing corridors of compartmental relationships, rather than at-
tempting to construct an entire block, monopolizing it and making “the system 
work”.
Yapp also suggested that due to the “compartmentalized nature” of early 
modern Ottoman social order, “the Muslim ideal of a stable society, based on 
justice and composed of the four classical pillars—bureaucrats, soldiers, mer-
chants and artisans, and peasants—bore little relation to […] reality […]”.48 
Considering the differences between the “compartmentalized nature” of the 
early modern Ottoman order and that of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia, 
the latter fifteenth-century reality was even farther removed from that ancient 
ideal of one stable and just society. Nevertheless, the ideal was also very pres-
ent across that reality’s unstable political landscape, perhaps even more ac-
tively than generally tends to be acknowledged. It informed widespread ideas 
about good rulership and legitimate socio-political order.49 It permeated the 
aforementioned multiple pursuits to organize relationships of coercion and 
power along the labels of ‘the men of the sword, the men of the pen and the 
men of the turbans’ and through legislation and legal action. It finally also 
guided many dichotomous explanations of the era’s fluid and volatile roles 
and hierarchies, such as the binaries of ‘Turks’ and ‘Tajiks’, ‘Persians’ and ‘Ar-
abs’, ‘elites’ (khassa) and ‘commoners’ (ʿamma), tax payers and tax recipients, 
commanders and administrators, or Muslims and Christians. These and many 
similar ideas, labels, actions, binaries and explanations contributed to the 
many appearances of social order across West-Asia, amidst those complex re-
alities of segmentation, fragmentation and competitive empowerment. Above 
all, they operated everywhere as highly fluid specimens of socio-cultural 
boundaries that were constantly crossed, challenged and reconfigured. In fact, 
the formulation of such boundaries with the aid of these and related ideas and 
explanations continued to represent important stakes in the endless negotia-
tion, accommodation, contestation and experimentation from which both 
compartments and corridors emerged, stimulating communication across 
such compartmentalization and contributing to the appearance of larger skel-
etons and contours of order.
48 Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 9.
49 Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East, esp. pp. 113–118 
(‘Post-Mongol Polities (1335–1506)’).
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These fluid socio-cultural boundaries, and these ideas and ideals more in 
general, were always also highly political, constructing, and constructed by, all 
kinds of relationships of power across Islamic West-Asia. As such they were 
always also part of the ideologies of Turko-Mongol rule in fifteenth-century 
West-Asia, and of wider apparatuses of political communication and perfor-
mance. Despite their importance for fifteenth-century West-Asia’s diverse tra-
jectories of state formation, these symbolic apparatuses have not been dealt 
with separately in this chapter. This is partly because that would go beyond 
the more socio-politically oriented focus of the current volume, but also be-
cause much pioneering work still remains to be done in this highly complex 
and intellectually sophisticated, but traditionally downgraded and even oft-
neglected, domain.50 Today these ideologies and discourses of power, and the 
highly intricate trans-regional webs of meaning-making and knowledge prac-
tices to which they pertain, are arguably even less well-known, studied and 
understood, in the more general entangled context of fifteenth-century Turko-
Mongol state formation in particular, than Islamic West-Asia’s power elites, its 
institutions and practices, and its socio-political transformations. Recent years 
have certainly seen a growing acknowledgement of the need for research into 
this field. Scholars are beginning to realize the potential value in investigating 
the nature and wide-ranging impact of the often very novel sets of ideas and 
ideals of legitimate rule and kingship that came to dominate West-Asian dis-
courses of power with and after Temür. There is also a growing acknowledge-
ment of the riches of this subject, and of the experimental creativity and the 
shared mix of memories, symbolic practices and cultural systems by which 
Turko-Mongol leaderships, Arabo-Persian courtiers and Muslim intellectuals 
of wide-ranging expertise and mobility engaged in legitimizing, explaining 
and disciplining the eclectic, violent and volatile political realities of the era. 
Models of leadership in West-Asia in the fifteenth century operationalized 
eclectic imaginations of social justice, divine favor, dynastic precedence, ideal 
rule, royal wisdom, millenarian sovereignty, charismatic sanctity and their like. 
50 See especially Watt, Islamic Political Thought and Crone, Medieval Islamic Political 
Thought. Despite the comprehensiveness suggested by these titles, these two authors gen-
erally prefer to neglect any detailed discussion of the later medieval period, due to their 
focus on the imamate. This was a religio-legal concept of Islamic sovereignty that ap-
peared in the fifteenth century with substantially altered meanings that are difficult to 
comprehend from Watt’s and Crone’s strictly Arabo-Islamic genealogical perspective. See 
also Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought (who tellingly decided to enti-
tle his brief survey of important fifteenth-century thinkers such as Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad 
Davānī and Faẓl Allāh Khunjī-Iṣfahānī “The Decline of Classical Islamic Political Thought” 
[pp. 183–188]).
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These highly creative symbolic apparatuses enabled very intense connections 
between the different courts of the era and their communicative systems, and 
also with their Perso-Islamic, Turko-Saljuq and Mongol-Chinggisid anteced-
ents as well as with the ways their imperial successors made their impressive 
appearances on the early-modern Eurasian stage.51 It remains a daunting task 
to untangle the genealogies, the communications and performances, and the 
functions and agents of these eclectic imaginations, which are to be situated 
within the fields of theology, philosophy, mysticism, occultism, mathematics, 
historiography and various other premodern Eurasian knowledge traditions. 
At the same time, pursuing this is highly desirable, not least because as dem-
onstrated above almost all of the, mostly narrative, extant sources for those 
trajectories of fifteenth-century state formation are in many ways products, 
and constituents, of those symbolic apparatuses. Even though it is a task that 
cannot be addressed in the current context, this certainly remains a highly rel-
evant and very promising one that calls for further, preferably collaborative, 
initiatives along similar lines of West-Asian, and for that matter Eurasian, en-
tangled research.
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